



Ce document est le fruit d’un long travail approuvé par le jury de 
soutenance et mis à disposition de l’ensemble de la 
communauté universitaire élargie. 
 
Il est soumis à la propriété intellectuelle de l’auteur : ceci 
implique une obligation de citation et de référencement lors de 
l’utilisation de ce document. 
 
D’autre part, toute contrefaçon, plagiat, reproduction illicite de 
ce travail expose à des poursuites pénales. 
 









Code la Propriété Intellectuelle – Articles L. 122-4 et L. 335-1 à 
L. 335-10 










En vue de l’obtention du 
 
 
DOCTORAT DE L’UNIVERSITE DE TOULOUSE 
 
Délivré par l’Université Toulouse Capitole 
 
École doctorale : Sciences Economiques-Toulouse School of Economics 
 
 
Présentée et soutenue par 
WANG Chunan 
 
le 23 Juin 2017 
 
Essays on Delay Reduction Contract, Airline Networks and 




Discipline : Sciences Economiques  
Unité de recherche : TSE-R (UMR CNRS 5314 – INRA 1415) 
Directeur de thèse  : Monsieur Doh-Shin JEON, Professeur, Université Toulouse 1 Capitole 
Co-directeur de thèse: Madame Estelle MALAVOLTI, Enseignant-Chercheur, Université 








Rapporteurs Monsieur Benny MANTIN, Professeur, University of Luxembourg 
 Monsieur Frédéric MARTY, CNRS Research Fellow, Université Côte d’Azur 
 
Suffragants Madame Estelle MALAVOLTI, Enseignant-Chercheur, UT1 Capitole et ENAC 
 Madame Carole HARITCHABALET, Professeur, Université de Pau et des 
Pays de l'Adour 
 
Abstract
This thesis consists of three self-contained papers, each of which corresponds to one
chapter.
In the context of SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) project, the Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) can provide a delay reduction service to airlines.
Thus, the first chapter, jointly written with Estelle Malavolti, studies the optimal design
of delay reduction contract signed between an ANSP and a monopoly airline. In the
contract design, we mainly consider the adverse selection problem, which comes from
airlines’ private information about their values of time. Then, we derive optimal contracts
analytically considering both the welfare-maximizing and profit-maximizing ANSP. We
find that, under incomplete information, the optimal degree of the delay reduction service
for the airline with a low value of time may be distorted downwards to decrease the
information rent of the airline with a high value of time. Moreover, because contracts
should be adjusted over time according to the evolution of some relevant exogenous
variables, we conduct comparative-static analysis to study the effects of safety standard
and flight frequency on optimal contracts. Besides, we use numerical examples to study
when a welfare-maximizing ANSP has to use public funds to provide the service.
The second chapter investigates the dual roles of congestion delays and horizontal
product differentiation in airline network choice. A particular feature of this work is
the incorporation of all possible network structures in a three-city network, including a
hub-and-spoke network (HS), point-to-point network (PP), mixed network (MX), 2-hub
network (2H), with a 3-hub network (3H) as an extension. More importantly, besides
contributing to the limited amount of literature on the effects of congestion delays, for the
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function of 2H, I focus on the exploitation of horizontal product differentiation rather than
hub airport congestion reduction. In reality, the horizontal product differentiation arises
as a result of different flight departure time slots and passengers’ brand loyalty. I find
that, first, because of the inclusion of congestion delays, the airline may choose PP even
when the extra travel time disutility of one-stop services is relatively low. Second, without
considering the airline’s fixed investments of developing a hub airport, 2H will dominate
the three other network structures as long as it is feasible, as it involves the horizontal
product differentiation in more markets than the three other network structures. Third,
comparative statics show that, under MX, for example, when the marginal congestion
delay cost increases, the change of flight frequency between two spoke airports depends
on the trade-off between the direct negative effect of a higher delay cost and the strategic
redistribution of traffic among different routes. Finally, welfare analysis shows the airline’s
inefficient biases towards PP and 2H.
The third chapter, jointly written with Wanjun Yao and Shigeyuki Hamori, proposes
that the agricultural land marketization affects the average output per unit of land, or
average land productivity, not only through improving the land allocation efficiency but
also through increasing the average operational farm size. The effect of the higher land
allocation efficiency on average land productivity is positive. However, when there exists
an inverse relationship between farm size and output per unit of land, or land produc-
tivity, the effect of the larger average operational farm size on average land productivity
is negative. Then, the net effect of the agricultural land marketization on average land
productivity depends on the comparison of these two channels. By using the agricul-
tural land marketization reform in China in 2008 as the indicator of marketization and
the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) database, this chapter empirically finds
that: first, there exists an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity in
China; second, the agricultural land marketization in China improves the land allocation
efficiency and increases the average operational farm size; and third, the higher land allo-
cation efficiency improves the average land productivity by 29.1% and the larger average
operational farm size reduces the average land productivity by 9.2%, implying that the
iii
agricultural land marketization in China finally improves the average land productivity
by 19.9%.
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Introduction
This thesis aims to apply the economic theories and empirical methods in the fields of
industrial organization and applied microeconomics to analyze the air transportation and
agricultural land markets. Specifically, this thesis consists of three self-contained papers,
each of which corresponds to one chapter. The first chapter mainly uses the methodology
of contract theory to address the adverse selection problem in the design of delay reduc-
tion contract in Europe. The second chapter investigates the dual roles of congestion
delays and horizontal product differentiation in airline network choice. Moreover, the
third chapter tests empirically whether or not the agricultural land marketization will
necessarily improve the average land productivity by examining the role of the inverse
relationship between farm size and land productivity.
In the context of SESAR (Single European Sky ATM1 Research) project, the Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) can provide a delay reduction service to airlines.
Thus, the first chapter, jointly written with Estelle Malavolti, studies the optimal design
of delay reduction contract signed between an ANSP and a monopoly airline.
Aviation in Europe is expected to experience a rapid growth and more delays in the
future. According to STATFOR (2013), in the most-likely scenario, there will be 14.4
million flights in Europe in 2035, 50% more than 2012. Moreover, air traffic growth
will be limited by the available airport capacity. When the capacity limits are reached,
congestion at airports will increase quite rapidly, leading to more delays. To satisfy the
development of EU air transport sector, in 2004, European Union and EUROCONTROL
founded the SESAR project, in which satisfying future safety needs and reducing delays
are important targets (see European Union and EUROCONTROL, 2015). In the context
1ATM is the abbreviation of Air Traffic Management.
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of SESAR, in order to reduce delays, the Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) can
provide a delay reduction service to airlines. In the short run, the service can be provided
for free because of generous funds of SESAR. In the long run, however, the ANSP will
face financial constraints. Then, a contract, the so-called delay reduction contract in this
chapter, signed between the ANSP and airlines will be necessary. Therefore, this chapter
aims to study the optimal design of delay reduction contract.
Specifically, we consider an ANSP, a monopoly airline, two airports, and a contract
signed between an ANSP and a monopoly airline to reduce delays, in which contracting
variables are the degree of the delay reduction service and the transfer from the airline
to the ANSP. In the contract design, we mainly consider the adverse selection problem,
which comes from airlines’ private information about their values of time, and thus the
trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction. In fact, airlines may have very different
values of time, for example, Air France and easyJet, and airlines always know better
about their values of time than the ANSP.
Then, we derive optimal contracts analytically considering both the welfare-maximizing
and profit-maximizing ANSP. In particular, we find that, under incomplete information,
the optimal degree of the delay reduction service for the airline with a low value of time
may be distorted downwards to decrease the information rent of the airline with a high
value of time. Moreover, because contracts should be adjusted over time according to the
evolution of some relevant exogenous variables, we conduct comparative-static analysis
to study the effects of safety standard and flight frequency on optimal contracts. Finally,
we use numerical examples to study when a welfare-maximizing ANSP has to use public
funds to provide the delay reduction service, and we find that, if the service is very ef-
fective, the ANSP may not have to use public funds; if the service is very ineffective, the
ANSP has to use public funds; if the effectiveness of the service is intermediate, when
the effectiveness decreases, the ANSP may not have to use public funds only when the
passengers’ value of time becomes higher.
This chapter is closely related to three branches of literature. In the incentives theory
and regulation literature, Caillaud et al. (1988) summarize two types of the regulator’s
3
objective function, that is, distributional objectives and the cost of public funds. Baron
and Myerson (1982) and Baron and Besanko (1984) use the distributional-objectives
objective function, while Laffont and Tirole (1986) use the objective function with the
cost of public funds. This chapter considers the cost of public funds when the ANSP acts
as a social planner. Specifically, because passengers can benefit from the service but do
not pay to the ANSP, it is possible that the service is socially desirable while the airline’s
benefit from the service is not as high as the total cost of providing the service. In this
case, the ANSP has to use public funds to subsidize the service and thus consider the
cost of public funds in the objective function.
The second branch of literature is the modeling of passenger utility. Some studies
follow Dixit (1979) to use a quadratic passenger utility function, for example, Lin (2012)
and Wang (2017). The main purpose of this kind of utility function is to include two
substitutable air transport services. In this chapter, however, we follow Brueckner (2004),
Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007), Flores-Fillol (2009), and Flores-Fillol (2010) and use
a linear utility function. This kind of utility function can help us simplify the analysis.
The third branch of literature is the modeling of delay function. Among others,
Brueckner (2002, 2005) models the delay cost as a non-decreasing function of the number
of flights during the peak travel period of a day. Moreover, US Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (1969) models delays as a convex function of the number of flights. This delay
function is estimated from steady-state queuing theory and has been used by Morrison
(1987), Zhang and Zhang (1997, 2003, 2006) and Basso (2008). Pels and Verhoef (2004),
De Borger and Van Dender (2006), Basso and Zhang (2007), and Yang and Zhang (2011)
use a linear delay function. In this chapter, we model the delay function to capture the
causes of delays. Specifically, our delay function consists of the delays due to excep-
tional events2 in own slot and the delays induced by other flights, in which the number
of exceptional events in a slot follows a Poisson distribution.
The second chapter investigates the dual roles of congestion delays and horizontal
product differentiation in airline network choice.
2Exceptional events can be, for example, adverse weather conditions, aircraft defects and airport
facilities limitations.
4
Air traffic delays remain a significant and worldwide reality. In Europe, from 2005
to 2015, the percentages of delayed flights for arrivals are approximately 40%, with an
average delay per delayed flight for arrivals of approximately 29 minutes (see EUROCON-
TROL, 2010, 2011, 2016). As a result, and considering also the time values estimated by
University of Westminster (2015) and Cook and Tanner (2015), delays are costly to both
airlines and passengers. In fact, it has been well established that different airline’s net-
work structures may result in varying degrees of delays.3 However, the means by which
airlines respond to these costly delays by adjusting their network structure is, to date,
little studied.4 Therefore, this chapter aims to study how congestion delays shape airline
network structure, within which the role of horizontal product differentiation will also be
investigated.
In the model, I consider a monopoly airline and passengers in three markets. Pas-
sengers maximize their utility, which is a quadratic function of traffic of imperfectly
substitutable non-stop and one-stop air transport services. This imperfect substitution
indicates the horizontal product differentiation of services. Moreover, passengers value
flight frequency because they dislike schedule delays. According to Douglas and Miller
(1974) and Panzar (1979), schedule delay is the absolute difference between a passen-
ger’s most preferred departure time and that of his/her actual departure. The higher the
flight frequency is, the shorter schedule delays will be. Thus, considering also the travel
time, the difference in flight frequency and travel time indicates the vertical product
differentiation of services.
The airline maximizes its profit by choosing a network structure, flight frequencies
and passenger traffic. One feature of the model is the coverage of all possible network
structures in a three-city network, that is, a hub-and-spoke network (HS), point-to-point
network (PP), mixed network (MX), and 2-hub network (2H), as well as a 3-hub network
(3H) as an extension. Under HS (e.g., Alitalia), passengers who travel between two
spoke airports are required to connect at a hub airport. Differing from HS, under PP
3For example, Mayer and Sinai (2003) find that hubbing is the primary economic contributor to air
traffic congestion.
4In the literature, only Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015) and Silva et al. (2014) consider congestion
delays in airline network choice.
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(e.g., Ryanair and easyJet), passengers can travel directly from one airport to any other.
Moreover, under MX (e.g., Air France), passengers who travel between two spoke airports
can choose either one-stop or non-stop services, implying that MX is a combination of
HS and PP. Finally, under 2H (e.g., Lufthansa and Air France-KLM group), two hubs
are available for connection, while under 3H, each airport works as a hub.
In addition, I assume that the airline’s cost function includes only the expected con-
gestion delay cost. In fact, this cost specification excludes the fixed cost of operating
a flight and the variable cost of serving a passenger. According to Doganis (2009), the
short-run marginal cost of serving an extra passenger on a flight is close to zero. In
addition, Smyth and Pearce (2007) and Pearce (2013) also claim a low marginal cost per
passenger. Thus, we can omit this in order to simplify the analysis. Fixed cost, however,
indeed accounts for a large share of the total cost. Previous literature models fixed cost
to capture the economies of traffic density and then to explain the existence of the hub-
and-spoke network. In fact, modeling the fixed cost will not provide further insights but
will make the model intractable. More importantly, excluding fixed cost can also help us
isolate the impact of the economies of traffic density on airline network choice.
The main trade-offs in the model are between congestion delays and schedule delays
and between flight frequency and travel time. For the former, if the flight frequency in one
route becomes higher, congestion delays in more than one route will increase. However,
passengers’ schedule delays in that route will decrease. For the latter, between two spoke
airports, non-stop services always have lower flight frequency but shorter travel time,
while one-stop services always have higher flight frequency but longer travel time.
When solving the model, I first consider HS, PP and MX alone in order to compare
them with Lin (2012). Besides the common results, I find, surprisingly, that the airline
may choose PP even when the extra travel time disutility of one-stop services is relatively
low. In fact, this result arises from the inclusion of congestion delays, that is, a negative
network externality. Specifically, on the one hand, because of the traffic concentration of
HS and the convex cost function with respect to flight frequencies, the introduction of
congestion delays, or negative network externality on the cost side, creates a cost disad-
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vantage for HS, and thus makes HS less profitable. On the other hand, the introduction of
an omitted negative network externality also reduces the region that makes MX feasible.
Then, there will emerge an interval of extra travel time disutility, in which the disutility
is too high to make HS more profitable and too low to make MX feasible, leaving PP as
the airline’s optimal network structure. The key insight from this result is that including
the omitted negative network externality makes HS and MX less effective than previously
understood as in Lin (2012). In fact, in addition to the commonly received advantage of
PP, that is, saving the extra travel time of connecting at a hub airport, this result might
provide another explanation for why some legacy airlines start to use PP in some local
markets.
I then incorporate 2H into the analysis. I find that, without considering the airline’s
fixed investments of developing a hub airport, 2H will dominate the three other network
structures as long as it is feasible. Because non-stop and one-stop services are imperfectly
substitutable, passengers can obtain higher utility if both non-stop and one-stop services
are available to choose than if only one of them is available. Under 2H, there are two
markets, in which both non-stop and one-stop services are available. Under MX, there
is only one such market. However, under HS and PP, passengers in any market cannot
choose between non-stop and one-stop services. Therefore, because of the exploitation
of horizontal product differentiation to a larger extent, 2H can generate higher passenger
utility and then a higher airline profit than the three other network structures. To
summarize, this result shows the role of horizontal product differentiation in improving
passenger utility and airline profit.
In fact, this result can also help us understand the multi-hubbing and de-hubbing
phenomena in the airline industry. In reality, we can observe that some airlines develop
new hubs and then use 2H (multi-hubbing), while some others change from 2H to a single
hub network (de-hubbing). Here comes a question: what is the motivation for airlines to
use 2H? One answer is that when an airline’s hub airport is congested, the airline can
develop another hub to reduce the congestion of the previous hub. However, this answer
might not be strong enough because besides 2H, PP and MX can also reduce hub airport
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congestion. The result above shows the role of horizontal product differentiation and thus
provides another explanation for the use of 2H.
Moreover, I conduct comparative-static analysis and find that, for the airline under
MX and 2H, there exist some strategic effects when the values of the parameters change,
due to the division of local and connecting traffic in one market. For instance, under MX,
when the marginal congestion delay cost increases, the change of flight frequency between
two spoke airports depends on the trade-off between the direct negative effect of a higher
delay cost and the strategic redistribution of traffic among different routes. Furthermore,
in welfare analysis, I derive not only the first-best, but also the second-best, socially
optimal network structure, and both show the airline’s inefficient biases towards PP and
2H. Besides which, I extend the analysis to 3H and again show the role of horizontal
product differentiation.
The contributions of this work are threefold. First, the majority of the airline network
choice literature (see Oum et al., 1995; Berechman and Shy, 1998; Kawasaki, 2008)
compare HS and PP alone, with a few others including one more network structure, either
MX (see Lin, 2012) or 2H (see Alderighi et al., 2005). In fact, Starr and Stinchcombe
(1992) and Hendricks et al. (1995, 1999) use rather general models, allowing the network
design to be endogenous. However, their frameworks focus mainly on airline cost but
not on passenger demand, which thus leaves little room for the optimality of network
structures other than HS and PP. Accordingly, this chapter contributes to the literature
by incorporating all possible network structures in a three-city network, each of which
has the potential to be an airline’s optimal network structure.
Second, most of the previous studies explain airline network choice from the point
of view of the economies of traffic density (see Bittlingmayer, 1990; Hendricks et al.,
1995, 1999), demand uncertainty (see Barla and Constantatos, 2005) and schedule delays
(see Brueckner, 2004), while only Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015) and Silva et al. (2014)
consider congestion delays. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the currently limited
literature available on the effects of congestion delays on airline network choice.
The third is regarding the perspective of analyzing 2H. The conventional wisdom
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concerning the function of 2H (see Bilotkach et al., 2013) is to divert passengers from
one hub to another and thus reduce hub airport congestion. In fact, a four-city network
is the minimum requirement in order to show the congestion reduction function of 2H;
however, this inevitably brings analytical difficulties. To make the analysis tractable,
previous literature (see Bilotkach et al., 2013) has had to simplify many important ele-
ments. Nevertheless, in this chapter, I focus on the exploitation of horizontal product
differentiation in 2H, which requires a three-city network only. In reality, the horizontal
product differentiation can come from, for instance, different departure time slots (see
Encaoua et al., 1996) and brand loyalty (see Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Brueckner
and Flores-Fillol, 2007).
This chapter is closely related to three branches of literature. Since the airline deregu-
lation in the USA in 1978, there is a growing body of literature on airline network choice,
in which the first branch is the scope of network structures. Previously, the literature has
focused on the choice between HS and PP, but recently there has been a shift towards
some “real-life” network structures, that is, MX and 2H. For MX, among others, Dunn
(2008) empirically examines an airline’s choice of providing non-stop services or not, given
that the airline has (not) provided one-stop services. Moreover, Fageda and Flores-Fillol
(2012) study hub airlines’ incentives to provide non-stop services between spoke airports
under two recent innovations, that is, the regional jet technology and low-cost business
model. Further, Lin (2012) studies the network choice among HS, PP and MX under both
monopoly and duopoly setups. For 2H, Bilotkach et al. (2013) use the utility function à
la Mussa-Rosen (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978) to study the function of diverting traffic of
2H. Moreover, Wang (2016) theoretically examines the optimality of 2H in the spirit of
Brueckner and Spiller (1991).
The second branch of literature is the theory explaining airline network choice. One
theory is that airlines can better exploit the economies of traffic density under HS. Ac-
cording to Hendricks et al. (1995), the economies of traffic density arise when the cost per
passenger on a route decreases with the number of passengers flying on that route. As a
result, because HS has a higher traffic density than PP, as long as the cost of extra travel
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time of one-stop services is not high enough, the total cost for a given level of demand
may be lower under HS than PP. Some empirical studies have confirmed the economies
of traffic density under HS (see Brueckner et al., 1992; Brueckner and Spiller, 1994).
Moreover, besides Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1995), theoretical studies explaining
airline network choice from the point of view of the economies of traffic density include,
for example, Bittlingmayer (1990), Oum et al. (1995) and Hendricks et al. (1999) 5.
Another theory concerns demand uncertainty. Barla and Constantatos (2005) show
the flexibility of HS under uncertainty. Interestingly, they also find that both airlines
may choose PP, because by committing not to enjoy the flexibility, airlines can avoid the
spread of competition from one market to others. Furthermore, Hu (2010) also considers
demand uncertainty but under a different setup.
Because passengers greatly value flight frequency (see Berry and Jia, 2010), schedule
delays may be an important factor affecting airline network choice. Berechman and Shy
(1998) and Brueckner and Zhang (2001) first connected airline network structure and
scheduling. Then, Brueckner (2004) builds a framework that improves upon the previous
two studies and shows that a high disutility of schedule delays would be conducive to HS.
In addition, other relevant studies include Kawasaki (2008) and Flores-Fillol (2009).
Furthermore, some studies have introduced congestion delays into their models. In
Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015), they find that, even if there is a higher delay cost, duopoly
airlines exhibit a preference for HS, which may be inefficient from the perspective of a
welfare-maximizing social planner. Moreover, Silva et al. (2014) also consider congestion
delays and show that a higher value of travel time favors PP. However, the frameworks of
these two studies do not allow for the analysis of MX and 2H. Besides which, in Fageda
and Flores-Fillol (2015), passenger demand is also perfectly inelastic.
The last theory is the horizontal product differentiation. Lin (2012) finds that HS
will be the airline’s optimal network structure if passengers do not differentiate between
non-stop and one-stop services too much, and if the extra travel time disutility of one-
stop services is low. However, if the passenger differentiation is substantial, MX (resp.
5Hendricks et al. (1999) also consider the nature of competition, that is, airlines compete aggressively
or not.
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PP) will be the airline’s optimal network structure when the extra travel time disutility
is low (resp. high).
The third branch of literature is the modeling of vertical and horizontal product
differentiation. With respect to the vertical product differentiation, Flores-Fillol (2010)
considers that airlines may compete in flight frequencies. Moreover, in the models of
Brueckner (2004) and Kawasaki (2008), one-stop services always cost more time than
non-stop services. With respect to the horizontal product differentiation, Encaoua et al.
(1996) consider the difference of the departure time slot, while Brueckner and Whalen
(2000) and Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007) consider brand loyalty. In addition, Lin
(2012) uses the quadratic utility function in Dixit (1979) to capture the horizontal product
differentiation.
The third chapter, jointly written with Wanjun Yao and Shigeyuki Hamori, tests
empirically whether or not the agricultural land marketization will necessarily improve
the average land productivity by examining the role of the inverse relationship between
farm size and land productivity.
For developing countries, especially those in transition from agricultural to non-
agricultural economy, on the one hand, the transition of economy reduces the amount
of agricultural labor significantly and thus decreases the utilization rate of agricultural
land. On the other hand, the transition increases the demand of agricultural products of
urban areas and thus further aggravates the balance between supply and demand. Given
the reality that the domestic farmland cannot be enlarged easily, governments in many
countries try to improve the output per unit of land, or land productivity, to increase the
supply of agricultural products.
According to economic theory, the agricultural land marketization can improve the
land allocation efficiency. After the agricultural land marketization, less efficient agri-
cultural producers can rent out or sell some of their land at a price higher than their
marginal production, while more efficient producers can rent in or buy some land at a
price lower than their marginal production. Finally, the agricultural land will be allocated
more efficiently through market mechanism (see Yao, 2000; Benjamin and Brandt, 2002;
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Carter and Yao, 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2005, 2008; Deininger et al., 2008a; Deininger
et al., 2008b; Jin and Deininger, 2009; Barrett et al., 2010). Then, if the agricultural
land marketization can improve the land allocation efficiency, can it also improve the
average output per unit of land, or average land productivity? The conventional answer
is affirmative because the higher land allocation efficiency implies the higher average land
productivity (see, for example, Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis, 20176). However, if we
consider the inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity, the answer is
uncertain.
In many developing countries, there exists an inverse relationship between farm size
and land productivity.7 That is, compared to rural households with a large farm size,
those with a small farm size have higher land productivity. This relationship has been
found in the countries of Asia (see Sen, 1962; Lau and Yotopoulos, 1971; Bardhan, 1973;
Rao and Chotigeat, 1981; Carter, 1984; Newell et al., 1997; Heltberg, 1998; Lamb, 2003),
Africa (see Collier, 1983; Barrett, 1996; Byiringiro and Reardon, 1996; Kimhi, 2006;
Carletto et al., 2013; Larson et al., 2014; Ali and Deininger, 2015), Europe (see Chayanov,
1926; Alvarez and Arias, 2004), and Latin America (see Berry and Cline, 1979; Cornia,
1985).8
After the agricultural land marketization, on the one hand, the previously unused
land can be used again, and thus the total operational farm size may increase. Given
the amount of rural households, the average operational farm size may also increase. On
the other hand, rural households can obtain monetary incomes from land transactions,
which can provide a basic guarantee for their migrations to urban areas. In this way,
the amount of rural households may decrease, and the average operational farm size may
6Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2017) use household-level data from Malawi and find that a real-
location of production factors to their efficient use will result in higher average total factor productivity
(TFP) of farmers, in which the farm TFP and the output per unit of land are found to be strongly
positively correlated across farms because the allocation of land is not related to productivity so many
productive farmers are constrained by size.
7The reasons explaining the existence of inverse relationship include, among others, land market
imperfections (see Heltberg, 1998; Lamb, 2003), labor market imperfections (see Sen, 1966; Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1985; Frisvold, 1994), credit market imperfections (see Feder, 1985; Eswaran and Kotwal,
1986; Carter, 1988), and risk (see Wiens, 1977; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Kevane, 1996).
8Some studies show that, in USA and Japan, farm size is positively correlated with land productivity
(see Sumner, 2014; Kawasaki, 2010).
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then increase. Under the inverse relationship, the increase of average operational farm
size will reduce the average land productivity.
To summarize, the agricultural land marketization affects the average land productiv-
ity not only through improving the land allocation efficiency but also through increasing
the average operational farm size.9 The improvement of land allocation efficiency has
a positive effect on average land productivity. However, when there exists an inverse
relationship between farm size and land productivity, the increase of average operational
farm size has a negative effect on average land productivity. Therefore, the agricultural
land marketization does not necessarily improve the average land productivity. Only
when the positive effect of the higher land allocation efficiency dominates the negative
effect of the larger average operational farm size, the marketization will finally improve
the average land productivity.
In this chapter, we use the year 2008 as the indicator of the agricultural land mar-
ketization in China to test empirically the effect of the marketization on average land
productivity. The empirical framework is the one for the study of inverse relationship
(see Binswanger et al., 1995; Assunção and Braido, 2007; Barrett et al., 2010; Carletto
et al., 2013) and the data we use is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
database10. Finally, we find that: first, there exists an inverse relationship between farm
size and land productivity in China; second, the agricultural land marketization in China
improves the land allocation efficiency and increases the average operational farm size;
third, the higher land allocation efficiency improves the average land productivity by
29.1% and the larger average operational farm size reduces the average land productivity
by 9.2%, implying that the agricultural land marketization in China finally improves the
average land productivity by 19.9%.
9The agricultural land marketization affects the average land productivity also through, for example,
influencing indirectly the amount of labor input and intermediate inputs. However, in this chapter, we
focus our discussions on the direct effects of the marketization, that is, improving the land allocation
efficiency and increasing the average operational farm size.
10http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china
Chapter 1
Contract Design for EU Air Traffic
Delay Reduction
1.1 Introduction
Aviation in Europe is expected to experience a rapid growth and more delays in the
future. According to STATFOR (2013), in the most-likely scenario, there will be 14.4
million flights in Europe in 2035, 50% more than 2012. Moreover, air traffic growth
will be limited by the available airport capacity. When the capacity limits are reached,
congestion at airports will increase quite rapidly, leading to more delays. To satisfy the
development of EU air transport sector, in 2004, European Union and EUROCONTROL
founded the SESAR (Single European Sky ATM1 Research) project, in which satisfying
future safety needs and reducing delays are important targets (see European Union and
EUROCONTROL, 2015). In the context of SESAR, in order to reduce delays, the Air
Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) can provide a delay reduction service to airlines.
Under the delay reduction service, when facing potential delays, an airline will contact
the ANSP to find a solution to reduce delays. After receiving the airline’s request, the
ANSP can find out several solutions satisfying all regulation constraints. Then, by costly
calculation, evaluation and coordination, the ANSP can determine the solution which can
reduce delays most and then implement it. In the short run, the service can be provided
1ATM is the abbreviation of Air Traffic Management.
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for free because of generous funds of SESAR. In the long run, however, the ANSP will
face financial constraints. Then, a contract, the so-called delay reduction contract in this
chapter, signed between the ANSP and airlines will be necessary. Therefore, this chapter
aims to study the optimal design of delay reduction contract.
Specifically, we consider an ANSP, a monopoly airline, two airports, and a contract
signed between an ANSP and a monopoly airline to reduce delays, in which contracting
variables are the degree of the delay reduction service and the transfer from the airline
to the ANSP. In the contract design, we mainly consider the adverse selection problem,
which comes from airlines’ private information about their values of time, and thus the
trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction. In fact, airlines may have very different
values of time, for example, Air France and easyJet, and airlines always know better
about their values of time than the ANSP.
Then, we derive optimal contracts analytically considering both the welfare-maximizing
and profit-maximizing ANSP. In particular, we find that, under incomplete information,
the optimal degree of the delay reduction service for the airline with a low value of time
may be distorted downwards to decrease the information rent of the airline with a high
value of time. Moreover, because contracts should be adjusted over time according to the
evolution of some relevant exogenous variables, we conduct comparative-static analysis
to study the effects of safety standard and flight frequency on optimal contracts. Finally,
we use numerical examples to study when a welfare-maximizing ANSP has to use public
funds to provide the delay reduction service, and we find that, if the service is very ef-
fective, the ANSP may not have to use public funds; if the service is very ineffective, the
ANSP has to use public funds; if the effectiveness of the service is intermediate, when
the effectiveness decreases, the ANSP may not have to use public funds only when the
passengers’ value of time becomes higher.
Related Literature
This chapter is closely related to three branches of literature. In the incentives theory
and regulation literature, Caillaud et al. (1988) summarize two types of the regulator’s
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objective function, that is, distributional objectives and the cost of public funds. Baron
and Myerson (1982) and Baron and Besanko (1984) use the distributional-objectives
objective function, while Laffont and Tirole (1986) use the objective function with the
cost of public funds. This chapter considers the cost of public funds when the ANSP acts
as a social planner. Specifically, because passengers can benefit from the service but do
not pay to the ANSP, it is possible that the service is socially desirable while the airline’s
benefit from the service is not as high as the total cost of providing the service. In this
case, the ANSP has to use public funds to subsidize the service and thus consider the
cost of public funds in the objective function.
The second branch of literature is the modeling of passenger utility. Some studies
follow Dixit (1979) to use a quadratic passenger utility function, for example, Lin (2012)
and Wang (2017). The main purpose of this kind of utility function is to include two
substitutable air transport services. In this chapter, however, we follow Brueckner (2004),
Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007), Flores-Fillol (2009), and Flores-Fillol (2010) and use
a linear utility function. This kind of utility function can help us simplify the analysis.
The third branch of literature is the modeling of delay function. Among others,
Brueckner (2002, 2005) models the delay cost as a non-decreasing function of the number
of flights during the peak travel period of a day. Moreover, US Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (1969) models delays as a convex function of the number of flights. This delay
function is estimated from steady-state queuing theory and has been used by Morrison
(1987), Zhang and Zhang (1997, 2003, 2006) and Basso (2008). Pels and Verhoef (2004),
De Borger and Van Dender (2006), Basso and Zhang (2007), and Yang and Zhang (2011)
use a linear delay function. In this chapter, we model the delay function to capture the
causes of delays. Specifically, our delay function consists of the delays due to excep-
tional events2 in own slot and the delays induced by other flights, in which the number
of exceptional events in a slot follows a Poisson distribution.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 introduces the model.
Section 1.3 derives optimal delay reduction contracts. Section 1.4 studies the adjustments
2Exceptional events can be, for example, adverse weather conditions, aircraft defects and airport
facilities limitations.
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of optimal contracts. That is, this section conducts comparative-static analysis to study
the effects of safety standard and flight frequency on optimal contracts. Section 1.5 uses
numerical examples to study when a welfare-maximizing ANSP has to use public funds
to provide the delay reduction service. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 The Model
We consider an ANSP, a monopoly airline, passengers with a massN , and an air transport
market connecting two airports.
Conditional on the use of the airline, following Brueckner (2004), Brueckner and
Flores-Fillol (2007), Flores-Fillol (2009), and Flores-Fillol (2010), the passenger utility is:
v = y − p+ b+ a (s)− αD (s) . (1.1)
In (1.1), y is the passengers’ income; p is the fare; b is the passengers’ travel benefit which
is uniformly distributed on the support [ζ, ξ]; a (s) is the passengers’ utility gain from a
safety standard s with a
′
(s) > 0; α is the passengers’ value of time3; and D (s) is expected
delays per flight (in time units). Moreover, the safety standard s is exogenous and can
vary within [s, s]. Note that s is far higher than the minimum safety requirement.
3According to University of Westminster (2015), three types of passenger costs of delay may be
considered: “hard” costs (borne by the airline, such as re-booking and compensation), “soft” costs (borne
by the airline, such as the loss of market share due to passenger dissatisfaction) and “internalized” costs
(borne by the passenger and not passed on to the airline, such as potential loss of business due to late
arrival at meeting). The passengers’ value of time in this model mainly refers to the “internalized” costs
in University of Westminster (2015).
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The specification of expected delays per flight4 is:




















In (1.2), the first term in the square brackets is the delays due to exceptional events in
own slot. We assume that the number of exceptional events in a slot follows a Poisson
distribution with parameter βT
f
, in which β is the exceptional event arriving rate; T is
the number of available hours; and f is the flight frequency. Assume that flights are
evenly spaced during available hours. Thus, the duration of a slot is T
f
. k is the number
of exceptional events. g (s) is the amount of delays caused by an exceptional event.
g
′
(s) > 0 captures the fact that the higher the safety standard is, the longer delays will
be. The second term in the square brackets is the delays induced by other flights, which
decreases with T
f
and increases with β and g (s). Moreover, the parameter γ > 0 is the
so-called delay externality parameter in this chapter. A greater γ implies a severer effect
from other flights. In fact, the second term can represent the delays caused by airport
congestion. The square brackets times two because there are two airports.
Passengers also have an outside option, for instance, traveling by train. Conditional
on the use of the outside option, the passenger utility is:
v0 = y + z, (1.3)
In (1.3), z is the net benefit of the outside option.
Thus, a passenger chooses to travel by plane when:
y − p+ b+ a (s)− αD (s) > y + z, (1.4)
4According to Cook and Tanner (2011), the cost of delays for airlines is calculated for strategic delays
(those accounted for in advance) and tactical delays (those incurred on the day of operations and not
accounted for in advance). Strategic delays are for adding buffer to the airline schedule. Tactical delays
include primary delays and secondary or reactionary delays, in which original delays caused by one
aircraft (primary delays) cause “knock-on” effects in the rest of the network (known as secondary or
reactionary delays). In fact, air traffic delays in this model mainly refer to tactical delays in Cook and
Tanner (2011). Moreover, the delays due to exceptional events in own slots and the delays induced
by other flights in the delay function of this model correspond roughly to the primary and reactionary
delays, as defined in Cook and Tanner (2011), respectively.
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ξ − ζ db
= [ξ − p+ a (s)− αD (s)− z] N
ξ − ζ . (1.5)
The airline’s cost is:
cairline = τq + δf + θfD (s) . (1.6)
In (1.6), τq is the variable cost, in which τ is the marginal cost per seat; δf is the fixed
cost, in which δ is the fixed operating cost of a flight; and θfD (s) is the supply side
delay cost, in which θ is the airline’s value of time. θ may be unobservable to the ANSP.




, in which θ, θ > 0
and ∆θ = θ − θ > 0. If θ is the airline’s private knowledge, the airline can be the one
with θ or θ with probabilities µ and 1− µ, respectively.
The airline maximizes profit by choosing the fare5, that is:
max
p
π = pq (p)− [τq (p) + δf + θfD (s)] . (1.7)
Letting η = N








η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)] , (1.9)
π∗ (θ, s) = −1
4
η {2 [ξ − τ + a (s)− z]− αD (s)}αD (s)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand side delay cost
− θfD (s)︸ ︷︷ ︸




η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z]2 − δf. (1.10)
In (1.10), we can find both the airline’s demand and supply side delay costs. Then, the
5In this model, flight frequency is not a endogenous decision variable of the airline. One reason
can be the slot control in Europe. That is, at all major European airports, take-off and landing slots
are allocated through grandfather right and “use it or lose it” rule. However, in the comparative-static
analysis, we will study how the change of flight frequency affects optimal contracts.
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passenger utility and surplus are:










(y + z) ηdb
︸ ︷︷ ︸
from outside option traffic
= −1
8






η [ξ + τ − a (s) + z]2
− 1
2
ηξ [ξ + τ − a (s)− z] + 1
2
ηξ2 − ηζ (y + z) + ηξy, (1.12)
respectively. In (1.12), we can find the total passenger utility loss resulting from delays.
The ANSP signs a contract with the airline, in which contracting variables are r and
t. r ∈ [0, 1] is the degree of the delay reduction service that the ANSP provides to the
airline and t is the transfer from the airline to the ANSP. After signing the contract,
expected delays per flight reduce from D (s) to D (s) [1− σ ln (1 + r)]. σ ln (1 + r) is the





measures the effectiveness of the service
and ln (1 + r) captures that the marginal value of the service is positive but decreasing
with the degree. Then, the fare, air traffic, airline profit, passenger utility, and passenger
surplus will be:
P ∗ (s, r) = p∗ (s) +
1
2
αD (s) σ ln (1 + r) , (1.13)
Q∗ (s, r) = q∗ (s) +
1
2
ηαD (s) σ ln (1 + r) , (1.14)





ηα2D (s)2 σ2 [ln (1 + r)]2 + q∗ (s)αD (s) σ ln (1 + r)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
demand side delay reduction benefit
+ θfD (s) σ ln (1 + r)︸ ︷︷ ︸,
supply side delay reduction benefit
(1.15)
V ∗ (s, r) = v∗ (s) +
1
2
αD (s) σ ln (1 + r) , (1.16)












passenger delay reduction benefit
(1.17)
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respectively. According to (1.13), (1.15) and (1.17), we can find that the airline can enjoy
both demand and supply side delay reduction benefits and passengers can enjoy higher
surplus even though the fare increases.
Finally, the ANSP’s cost of providing the service is:
CANSP (s, r) = m (s) r. (1.18)
In (1.18), m (s) is the marginal cost of the service, which increases with the safety stan-
dard, that is, m
′
(s) > 0. In fact, when providing the service, the ANSP has to spend
more time on evaluation and coordination for satisfying a higher safety standard, which
will inevitably result in a higher cost.6














Next, we will derive optimal contracts by considering both the welfare-maximizing and
profit-maximizing ANSP.
1.3.1 Welfare-Maximizing ANSP
The welfare-maximizing ANSP’s objective is to maximize social welfare, that is:
max
{(r,t)}
W = PS∗ (s, r) + Π∗ (θ, s, r)− CANSP (s, r)− λ [CANSP (s, r)− t]✶t<C(s,r), (1.19)
6Another feasible setup is the linear benefit and convex cost, which is essentially equivalent to our
setting, that is, the concave benefit and linear cost.
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in which λ is the shadow cost of public funds.
Next, we discuss the model solution according to the passengers’ value of time α.7
1.3.1.1 Scenario 1: α = 0
When α = 0, passengers cannot enjoy any benefit from the service, implying that the
airline in fact delegates the provision of the service to the ANSP. Thus, the optimization
problem of the ANSP, or the airline, is:
max
r
W = Π∗ (θ, s, r)− CANSP (s, r) . (1.20)
Then, by taking the first-order and second-order conditions of (1.20), we can obtain


























t∗ ∈ [m (s) r∗,Π∗ (θ, s, r∗)− π∗ (θ, s)] . (1.24)
Because θ > θ, we have r∗ > r∗, that is, the airline with a high value of time will enjoy a
higher degree of the service.
Moreover, by checking r∗ > 0 and r∗ > 0, we can find that the delay reduction service
will be provided to the airline with θ and θ if and only if σ > m(s)
θfD(s)
and σ > m(s)
θfD(s)
hold,
respectively, that is, the service is effective enough.
7We focus our following discussions on interior solutions. Moreover, these solutions can be imple-
mented only when the social values of the service are non-negative, that is, [PS∗ (s, r)− ps∗ (s)] +
[Π∗ (θ, s, r)− π∗ (θ, s)]− CANSP (s, r)− λ [CANSP (s, r)− t]✶t<C(s,r) > 0.
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1.3.1.2 Scenario 2: α > ξ−τ+a(s)−z
D(s)
According to the passenger utility, we have:
ξ > b > p− a (s) + αD (s) + z > τ − a (s) + αD (s) + z
⇒ α 6 ξ − τ + a (s)− z
D (s)
. (1.25)
Thus, when α > ξ−τ+a(s)−z
D(s)
, no passenger will choose to travel by plane. Then, the air
transport market will close down and there will be no such contract.
1.3.1.3 Scenario 3: 0 < α 6 ξ−τ+a(s)−z
D(s)
and High Airline Benefit
In this scenario, both passengers and the airline can benefit from the service and the
airline’s benefit is higher than the ANSP’s cost of providing the service.
Complete Information Under complete information, it is optimal for the ANSP to
set the transfer at least as the cost of providing the service. Thus, the optimization
problem of the ANSP is:
max
r
W = PS∗ (s, r) + Π∗ (θ, s, r)− CANSP (s, r) . (1.26)
Then, by taking the first-order condition of (1.26), we can obtain that the first-










respectively. Specifically, as shown in (1.27) and (1.29), rFB and rFB are determined
by Ω and Ω, respectively. For both Ω and Ω, the optimal degree is determined by the
intersection of a logarithmic and linear function of r. According to (1.27) and (1.29),
because θ > θ, we also have rFB > rFB. A detailed discussion about the second-order
condition of (1.26) is in Section 1.7.1.1. Discussions about other second-order conditions
in this chapter are similar to Section 1.7.1.1 and thus are omitted hereafter.8 Moreover,
8All omitted discussions about second-order conditions are available upon request.
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t
FB
and tFB are given by (1.28) and (1.30), respectively.










































− π∗ (θ, s)
]
. (1.30)
Incomplete Information Under incomplete information, the first-best optimal de-
grees of the service can be feasible and public funds may still not be used.









− CANSP (s, r)
]
+ (1− µ) [PS∗ (s, r) + Π∗ (θ, s, r)− CANSP (s, r)] . (1.31)
For feasible separating contracts, the airline’s incentive compatibility and participa-




















Π∗ (θ, s, r)− t > π∗ (θ, s) . (1.35)











u = Π∗ (θ, s, r)− π∗ (θ, s)− t. (1.37)
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Then, we can write the airline’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints as:
u > u+∆θfD (s) σ ln (1 + r) , (1.38)
u > u−∆θfD (s) σ ln (1 + r) , (1.39)
u > 0, (1.40)
u > 0. (1.41)
In order to solve the ANSP’s problem, first make (1.38) and (1.41) be binding and
omit (1.39) and (1.40) and then check the omitted constraints after solving the problem.
Thus, we have:
u = ∆θfD (s) σ ln (1 + r) , (1.42)
u = 0. (1.43)
In fact, the maximization of (1.31) gives the same optimal degrees of the service
as under complete information, that is, rFB and rFB determined by (1.27) and (1.29).
Moreover, the second-best optimal degrees rSB = rFB and rSB = rFB can satisfy the





















− π∗ (θ, s) , (1.45)






. Furthermore, as shown in (1.44), the ANSP provides




to the airline with θ in order to make it not







, the ANSP may still propose separating contracts by using
public funds or propose a pooling contract without using public funds instead. The
separating contracts are better than the pooling contract in terms of efficiency, while the
pooling contract saves the cost of public funds. As the optimality between these two
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types of contracts depends on parameter values, we will not discuss them in details.
1.3.1.4 Scenario 4: 0 < α 6 ξ−τ+a(s)−z
D(s)
and Low Airline Benefit
In this scenario, both passengers and the airline can benefit from the service and the
airline’s benefit is lower than the ANSP’s cost of providing the service. Therefore, as
long as the social benefit of the service outweighs the social cost, it is optimal for the
ANSP to use public funds to cover the part of cost which cannot be covered by the
airline’s transfer.
Because the analysis for rFB and rFB under complete information is similar to that
in Scenario 3, we will only derive optimal contracts under incomplete information.
Incomplete Information Under incomplete information, the ANSP maximizes the









− CANSP (s, r)− λ
[
CANSP (s, r)− t
]}
+ (1− µ) {PS∗ (s, r) + Π∗ (θ, s, r)− CANSP (s, r)− λ [CANSP (s, r)− t]} ,
(1.46)
subject to the airline’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints as shown in
(1.32) through (1.41).









−∆θfD (s) σ ln (1 + r) , (1.47)
t = Π∗ (θ, s, r)− π∗ (θ, s) , (1.48)
into (1.46) and taking the first-order condition of (1.46), we can obtain the second-









, as shown in (1.49) through
(1.52). Again, rSB and rSB are determined by the intersection of a logarithmic and linear
function and can satisfy omitted constraints. Moreover, the second-order condition can
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be satisfied.










− (3 + 2λ) η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ


















η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]α
+θf
}



















− (3 + 2λ) η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ
−4 (1 + λ) θfD (s) σ + 4 µ
















η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]α





According to (1.49) and (1.51), for the optimal degrees of the service, we can obtain
rSB = rFB, that is, there is no distortion for the airline with θ, while rSB < rFB, that is,
there is a downward distortion for the one with θ. Here, we also have rSB > rSB. More-





In fact, under incomplete information, the optimal degree for the airline with θ is dis-
torted downwards to decrease the information rent of the airline with θ, which reflects
the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction. The graphical comparison of optimal
degrees between complete and incomplete information is in Section 1.7.1.2.
1.3.2 Profit-Maximizing ANSP
The profit-maximizing ANSP’s objective is to maximize the difference between the trans-
fer and the cost of providing the service, that is:
max
{(r,t)}
H = t− CANSP (s, r) . (1.53)
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Next, we will derive optimal contracts under 0 < α 6 ξ−τ+a(s)−z
D(s)
.
Complete Information Under complete information, the ANSP will set the transfer
as the airline’s benefit from the service, that is, t = Π∗ (θ, s, r) − π∗ (θ, s). Thus, the
optimization problem of the ANSP is:
max
r
H = Π∗ (θ, s, r)− π∗ (θ, s)− CANSP (s, r) . (1.54)
Then, by taking the first-order condition of (1.54), we can obtain that the first-










respectively, as shown in (1.55) through (1.58). Again, rFB and rFB are determined
by the intersection of a logarithmic and linear function, and because θ > θ, we have
rFB > rFB. Moreover, the second-order condition can be satisfied.




























η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]α
+θf
}





























η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]α





Incomplete Information Under incomplete information, the ANSP maximizes the





t− CANSP (s, r)
]
+ (1− µ) [t− CANSP (s, r)] , (1.59)
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subject to the airline’s incentive compatibility and participation constraints as shown in
(1.32) through (1.41).
Then, by taking the first-order condition of (1.59), we can obtain the second-best









, as shown in (1.60) through (1.63).
Again, rSB and rSB are determined by the intersection of a logarithmic and linear func-
tion and can satisfy omitted constraints. Moreover, the second-order condition can be
satisfied.




























η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]α
+θf
}



















− η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ − 2θfD (s) σ
+2
µ
















η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]α





According to (1.60) and (1.62), for the optimal degrees of the service, we can obtain
rSB = rFB, that is, there is no distortion for the airline with θ, while rSB < rFB, that is,
there is a downward distortion for the one with θ. Here, we also have rSB > rSB. More-





1.4 Adjustments of Optimal Contracts
Because contracts should be adjusted over time according to the evolution of some rele-
vant exogenous variables, we will study the effects of safety standard and flight frequency
on optimal contracts. Moreover, we will analyze only the adjustments of optimal con-
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tracts under incomplete information in Scenario 4 of welfare-maximizing ANSP. For other
optimal contracts, the analysis is similar and thus is omitted hereafter.
When 0 < α 6 ξ−τ+a(s)−z
D(s)
, we do not have explicit solutions for the optimal degree of
the service. Thus, we will use derivatives of implicit functions. Specifically, for a variable









= slope (LOGR)− slope (LR) < 0, (1.65)
holds for any optimal degree, the sign of ∂r
∂xl
is the same as that of ∂Ω
∂xl
. That is, in order
to see the effect of a variable on the optimal degree, we just need to study its effect on
the implicit function determining the optimal degree.
1.4.1 Effect of Safety Standard
Undoubtedly, safety is the highest priority in air transport sector and the safety standard
always becomes higher. Thus, it is worthy to study how the improvement of safety
standard affects optimal degrees. We first give a definition.














The safety elasticity of delays (resp. cost) measures the percentage change in delays
caused by an exceptional event (the marginal cost of the service) in response to a one














≡ − (3 + 2λ) ηαD (s) σs
















≡ − (3 + 2λ) ηαD (s) σs







Then, we have Proposition 1.1.
Proposition 1.1.










Proof. We first consider the effect of s on rSB. Taking the derivative of (1.49) with respect









− (3 + 2λ) ηα2D (s) σ


















+ (3 + 2λ) ηαD (s) σa
′


















m (s) (εgs − εms)






































































and plugging (1.72) into (1.71), we can obtain the first point of Proposition 1.1.
Moreover, we can obtain the second point analogously.
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According to Proposition 1.1, the optimal degree of the service increases with safety
standard if and only if the difference between the safety elasticity of delays and cost is
greater than a threshold, which is a function of the direct effect of the improvement of
safety standard on passenger utility. Moreover, if passengers can directly benefit from a
higher safety standard, the threshold will be negative.
To illustrate the first point of Proposition 1.1, we should analyze the effects of safety
standard in (1.70). Specifically, the improvement of safety standard implies longer delays
caused by an exceptional event, a higher passengers’ utility gain and a higher marginal
cost of the service. The first term in (1.70) shows a direct and an indirect effect of longer
delays caused by an exceptional event on the degree. On the one hand, longer delays
will increase the marginal benefit of the service to society and thus give the ANSP a
direct incentive to increase the degree. εgs in the first point represents part of this direct
effect. On the other hand, longer delays will decrease the air traffic, which implies a lower
marginal benefit of the service to society, and thus give the ANSP an indirect incentive
to decrease the degree. In the second term, the higher utility gain will increase the air
traffic, which implies a higher marginal benefit of the service to society, and thus gives
the ANSP an indirect incentive to increase the degree. In addition, in the third term,
the higher marginal cost of the service gives the ANSP a direct incentive to decrease the
degree. εms in the first point represents this direct effect. Finally, the condition in the
first point is the synthesis of the effects above, which, more precisely, is about whether
or not the effects conducive to the increase of the degree can dominate the others.
Moreover, we can illustrate the second point analogously, except considering another
effect in terms of the information rent. Specifically, longer delays caused by an exceptional
event will increase the information rent of the airline with θ, which is a function of rSB,
and thus give the ANSP an indirect incentive to decrease rSB.
Next, as we discuss a lot about the effects of the improvement of safety standard,
through longer delays caused by an exceptional event, we extend our analysis to study
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(1 + λ)m (s) (1 + rSB)
(3 + 2λ) ησ [1− σ ln (1 + rSB)] . (1.74)
Then, we have Proposition 1.2.
Proposition 1.2.










Proof. In Section 1.7.2.
According to Proposition 1.2, the optimal degree increases with expected delays per
flight if and only if the passengers’ value of time is lower than a threshold.
As shown in the analysis of Proposition 1.1, longer delays affect optimal degrees
mainly through a direct effect (higher marginal benefit of the service to society) and an
indirect effect (less traffic). Proposition 1.2 tells us that, if the passengers’ value of time
is relatively low, the direct effect will dominate the indirect one, and then optimal degrees
will increase. Otherwise, the outside option will be more valuable for passengers. Thus,










, it is possible that when delays become longer,









under complete information, we have Corollary 1.1.

















), optimal degrees under complete (resp. incomplete) infor-

















implies that the existence of information rent increases the possibility that op-
timal degrees move in opposite directions.
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1.4.2 Effect of Flight Frequency
In this model, because of the slot control in Europe, we assume that flight frequency is
not a endogenous decision variable of the airline. Here, we study how the change of flight
frequency affects optimal degrees.
We first introduce some notations. According to Proposition 1.2, ∂r
SB
∂D(s)
> 0 if and
only if Φ > 0 and ∂r
SB
∂D(s)
> 0 if and only if Ψ > 0, in which:






















Moreover, let Γf and Γf denote two thresholds, in which:






Γf ≡ Γ− 2
[
























(k − 1)! . (1.79)
In fact, Γ is a threshold such that ∂D(s)
∂f
> 0 if and only if γ > Γ. Then, we have
Proposition 1.3.
Proposition 1.3.










Proof. We first consider the effect of f on rSB. Taking the derivative of (1.49) with









− (3 + 2λ) ηα2D (s) σ
+(3 + 2λ) η (ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s))ασ + 4 (1 + λ) θfσ
]























+ 4 (1 + λ) θD (s) σ.
(1.80)




































Next, using (1.77) and (1.79), we can obtain the first point of Proposition 1.3.
Moreover, we can obtain the second point analogously.
According to Proposition 1.3, when the optimal degree of the service increases with
expected delays per flight, it will increase with flight frequency if and only if the delay
externality parameter is greater than a threshold. However, when the optimal degree
decreases with expected delays per flight, it will increase with flight frequency if and only
if the delay externality parameter is less than a threshold.
To illustrate the first point of Proposition 1.3, we should analyze the effects of flight
frequency in (1.80). Specifically, the increase of flight frequency implies shorter delays
due to exceptional events in own slot, longer delays induced by other flights and a higher
supply side delay reduction benefit of the airline. In (1.80) The first term shows the
change of delays and the second term shows the change of supply side delay reduction
benefit.
First consider the case Φ > 0. In this case, we have Γ > Γf . If the externality of
delays between flights is significant, that is, γ > Γ, the delays induced by other flights
will dominate the delays due to exceptional events in own slot. Thus, expected delays
per flight become longer when flight frequency increases. Given Φ > 0, that is, the direct
effect of longer delays (higher marginal benefit of the service to society) dominates the
indirect effect of longer delays (less traffic), the net effect shown in the first term in (1.80)
is to increase rSB when flight frequency increases. Considering also the higher supply
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side delay reduction benefit of the airline shown in the second term in (1.80), rSB will
increase with flight frequency.
However, if the externality of delays between flights is not significant, that is, γ < Γ,
the delays induced by other flights will be dominated by the delays due to exceptional
events in own slot. Thus, expected delays per flight become shorter when flight frequency
increases, and then the net effect shown in the first term in (1.80) is to decrease rSB when




6 γ < Γ, that is, the externality of delays
between flights is not very insignificant, the effect from the delays due to exceptional
events in own slot will be relatively weak, compared with the higher supply side delay
reduction benefit of the airline shown in the second term in (1.80). Then, rSB will still




, the effect from the delays
due to exceptional events in own slot will be strong enough. Then, rSB will decrease with
flight frequency. To summarize, when Φ > 0, rSB will increase with flight frequency if




. Moreover, we can analyze the case Φ < 0 analogously.
In fact, the analysis for the second point of Proposition 1.3 is similar as above, except
that we should also consider the effect of flight frequency on the information rent of the
airline with θ.
1.5 Use of Public Funds
For a welfare-maximizing ANSP, when the airline’s benefit is higher than the ANSP’s
cost of providing the service (Scenario 3), the ANSP may not have to use public funds.
However, when the airline’s benefit is lower than the ANSP’s cost of providing the service
(Scenario 4), the ANSP has to use public funds. Therefore, in this section, by choosing
proper parameter values9 and function specifications, we use numerical examples to study
when a welfare-maximizing ANSP has to use public funds to provide the delay reduction
service.
Specifically, in all numerical examples, we use a (s) = 0.5 ∗ ln s
ln 2
, g (s) = 0.01 ∗ 2s and
9Parameter values used in numerical examples can satisfy all second-order conditions. They can
also ensure that the social values of the service are non-negative, that is, [PS∗ (s, r)− ps∗ (s)] +
[Π∗ (θ, s, r)− π∗ (θ, s)]− CANSP (s, r)− λ [CANSP (s, r)− t]✶t<C(s,r) > 0.
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m (s) = 0.06 + 0.01s. As we can see, a (s) is a concave function of s; g (s) is a convex
function of s; and m (s) is a linear function of s. Moreover, we use β = 0.01, γ = 120,
θ = 1, λ = 0.04, N = 2, ξ = 3, ζ = 1, s = 2, τ = 0.8, T = 1.5, f = 1, and z = 2.
Consider first the airline’s net benefit from the service:
ω = Π∗ (θ, s, r)− π∗ (θ, s)− CANSP (s, r) , (1.82)
which is the net benefit of the airline when it is asked to pay the total cost of providing
the service. By using a large number of numerical examples, we can find that, for each
set of parameter values, there exists a threshold r̂ such that ω > 0 if and only if r 6 r̂.
Thus, as long as r > r̂, the ANSP has to use public funds to provide the service. For
example, using α = 0.35 and σ = 1
ln 2
, we can obtain Figure 1.210.
Figure 1.2: The Airline’s Net Benefit from the Service and r̂
Denote the marginal benefit of the service to society by MB and the marginal cost
of the service to ANSP by MC. If MB (r̂) 6 MC, in order to make MB equal to
MC, the ANSP will decrease the degree, and then the optimal degree will be r− with
r− 6 r̂. When r = r−, the airline’s benefit is higher than the ANSP’s cost of providing
the service, implying ω > 0, and thus the ANSP may not have to use public funds.
10Note that the curve in Figure 1.2 seems smooth, while it is in fact not. Because that curve only
fluctuates in extremely small intervals, we can regard it as a smooth one. Moreover, because of the
fluctuation of the curve, some values smaller than r̂ may also make u = 0. However, we can omit them
because they are extremely close to r̂.
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However, if MB (r̂) > MC, in order to make MB equal to MC, the ANSP will increase
the degree, and then the optimal degree will be r+ with r+ > r̂. When r = r+, the
airline’s benefit is lower than the ANSP’s cost of providing the service, implying ω < 0,
and thus the ANSP has to use public funds.
Consider next two important parameters, that is, the passengers’ value of time α and
the effectiveness of the service σ. Here, we use the following values of α and σ: α = 0.05α̃
with α̃ ∈ [0, 50] ∩ Z and σ = 0.05 ∗ σ̃
ln 2
with σ̃ ∈ [9, 20] ∩ Z. For each set of parameter
values, we calculate r̂. Then, we calculate MB (r̂)−MC. If the difference is positive, the
ANSP has to use public funds. Otherwise, the ANSP may not have to use public funds.
Calculation results are shown in Figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3: α, σ and Use of Public Funds
In Figure 1.3, we find that, if σ is high, that is, the service is very effective, the airline
can always obtain a high benefit from the service. Thus, the ANSP may not have to
use public funds. If σ is low, that is, the service is very ineffective, the airline can only
obtain a very limited benefit from the service. Thus, the ANSP has to use public funds.
Finally, if σ falls into an intermediate interval, that is, the effectiveness of the service
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is intermediate, when the effectiveness decreases, the ANSP may not have to use public
funds only when the passengers’ value of time α becomes higher. Because the passengers’
value of time is positively related to the total benefit of the service to society, a higher α
can compensate the loss of benefits resulting from the decrease of the effectiveness of the
service.
1.6 Conclusion
In the context of SESAR project, an ANSP can provide a delay reduction service to
airlines. Thus, this chapter studies the optimal design of delay reduction contract signed
between an ANSP and a monopoly airline. In the contract design, the main issue is to
address the adverse selection problem, which comes from airlines’ private information
about their values of time. Then, we derive optimal contracts analytically considering
both the welfare-maximizing and profit-maximizing ANSP, in which we find that, under
incomplete information, the optimal degree of the service for the airline with a low value
of time may be distorted downwards. Moreover, we conduct comparative-static analysis
to study how the changes of safety standard and flight frequency affect optimal contracts.
Besides, we use numerical examples to study when a welfare-maximizing ANSP has to
use public funds to provide the service.
This chapter focuses on a monopoly airline market structure. Thus, an extension to
oligopoly airline market structure and a study for strategic interactions between airlines
will be a direction of future research. Moreover, in this chapter, passengers only make
a single trip and the passengers’ demand is inelastic. Thus, multiple trips and elastic
demand are also possible extensions.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Optimal Contracts
1.7.1.1 Second-Order Condition in Complete Information in Scenario 3
In (1.27), the first term of Ω is a logarithmic function of rFB and we denote it by LOGR;
and the second term of Ω is a linear function of rFB and we denote it by LR. Analogously,
in (1.29), the first term of Ω is a logarithmic function of rFB and we denote it by LOGR;
and the second term of Ω is a linear function of rFB and we denote it by LR.
Next, we try to confirm the second-order condition of (1.26) according to the slope of
the logarithmic and linear functions and the intercept of the linear function on horizontal




θfD (s) σ −m (s)
]
+ 3η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ, (1.83)
I2 = 4 [θfD (s) σ −m (s)] + 3η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ. (1.84)





and I2 > 0





is equivalent to 0 < 3ηα2D (s)2 σ2 6
4m (s) and implies that the slope of LR (resp. LR) is greater than that of LOGR (resp.
LOGR) for any r. Moreover, I2 > 0 implies that the signs of LR’s and LR’s intercepts
on horizontal axis are positive.
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Figure 1.4: Case 1 (Complete Information of Scenario 3)














and I2 > 0
This case is shown in Figure 1.5. In this case, the slope of LR (resp. LR) is first less
and then greater than that of LOGR (resp. LOGR). Moreover, the signs of LR’s and
LR’s intercepts on horizontal axis are positive.
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Figure 1.5: Case 2 (Complete Information of Scenario 3)









































































, I1 > 0, and I2 < 0
This case is shown in Figure 1.6. In this case, the slope of LR (resp. LR) is first
less and then greater than that of LOGR (resp. LOGR). Moreover, the sign of LR’s
intercept on horizontal axis is positive, while the sign of LR’s intercept on horizontal axis
CHAPTER 1. DELAY REDUCTION CONTRACT 42
is negative.
Figure 1.6: Case 3 (Complete Information of Scenario 3)











As shown in Figure 1.6, LOGR and LR have two intersections. For the first intersec-







4 (1 + r̂)2
{
3ηα2D (s)2 σ2 [1− ln (1 + r̂)]
−3η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ − 4θfD (s) σ}
>
1
4 (1 + r̂)2
{
3ηα2D (s)2 σ2 [1− ln (1 + r̂)]− 4m (s)
}
. (1.89)






violating the second-order condition.
Next, consider the second intersection of LOGR and LR, that is, r = rFB. As shown
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in Figure 1.6, we have:
4m (s) =
3ηα2D (s)2 σ2 ln (1 + rtan)
J + rtan
. (1.90)
Because the sign of LR’s intercept on horizontal axis is negative, there exists a solution
only when J > |rint|, that is:
J =




−3η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ − 4θfD (s) σ + 4m (s)
4m (s)
= |rint| . (1.91)
Then, according to (1.86), we have:
−3η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ − 4θfD (s) σ
< 3ηα2D (s)2 σ2 ln (1 + rtan)− 4m (s) (1 + rtan)

























−3η [ξ − τ + a (s)− z − αD (s)]αD (s) σ − 4θfD (s) σ}
<
3ηα2D (s)2 σ2














4 (1 + rFB)2
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Then, because 3ηα2D (s)2 σ2 1
(1+rFB)














and I1 < 0
This case is shown in Figure 1.7. In this case, the slope of LR (LR) is first less
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and then greater than that of LOGR (LOGR). Moreover, the signs of LR’s and LR’s
intercepts on horizontal axis are negative.
Figure 1.7: Case 4 (Complete Information of Scenario 3)











1.7.1.2 Comparison of Optimal Degrees in Scenario 4
The comparison is shown is Figures 1.8 through 1.12.
1.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. We first consider the effect of D (s) on rSB. Taking the derivative of (1.49) with


















Rewriting (1.94), we can obtain the first point of Proposition 1.2.
CHAPTER 1. DELAY REDUCTION CONTRACT 45
Figure 1.8: Case 1 (Scenario 4)
Moreover, we can obtain the second point analogously.
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Figure 1.9: Case 2 (Scenario 4)
Figure 1.10: Case 3-1 (Scenario 4)
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Figure 1.11: Case 3-2 (Scenario 4)
Figure 1.12: Case 4 (Scenario 4)
Chapter 2
Congestion Delays, Horizontal Product
Differentiation and Airline Networks
2.1 Introduction
Air traffic delays remain a significant and worldwide reality. In Europe, from 2005 to
2015, the percentages of delayed flights for arrivals are approximately 40%, with an
average delay per delayed flight for arrivals of approximately 29 minutes (see Figure 2.1).
As a result, and considering also the time values estimated by University of Westminster
(2015) and Cook and Tanner (2015), delays are costly to both airlines and passengers.
In fact, it has been well established that different airline’s network structures may result
in varying degrees of delays.1 However, the means by which airlines respond to these
costly delays by adjusting their network structure is, to date, little studied.2 Therefore,
this chapter aims to study how congestion delays shape airline network structure, within
which the role of horizontal product differentiation will also be investigated.
In the model, I consider a monopoly airline and passengers in three markets. Pas-
sengers maximize their utility, which is a quadratic function of traffic of imperfectly
substitutable non-stop and one-stop air transport services. This imperfect substitution
1For example, Mayer and Sinai (2003) find that hubbing is the primary economic contributor to air
traffic congestion. Moreover, Figure 2.2 also provides an evidence.
2In the literature, only Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015) and Silva et al. (2014) consider congestion
delays in airline network choice.
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Percentage of Delayed Flights for Arrivals
Average Delay per Delayed Flight for Arrivals (mins)
Figure 2.1: Air Traffic Delays for Arrivals in Europe
Source: EUROCONTROL (2010, 2011, 2016)
indicates the horizontal product differentiation of services. Moreover, passengers value
flight frequency because they dislike schedule delays. According to Douglas and Miller
(1974) and Panzar (1979), schedule delay is the absolute difference between a passen-
ger’s most preferred departure time and that of his/her actual departure. The higher the
flight frequency is, the shorter schedule delays will be. Thus, considering also the travel
time, the difference in flight frequency and travel time indicates the vertical product
differentiation of services.
The airline maximizes its profit by choosing a network structure, flight frequencies
and passenger traffic. One feature of the model is the coverage of all possible network
structures in a three-city network, that is, a hub-and-spoke network (HS), point-to-point
network (PP), mixed network (MX), and 2-hub network (2H), as well as a 3-hub network
(3H) as an extension. Under HS (e.g., Alitalia), passengers who travel between two
spoke airports are required to connect at a hub airport. Differing from HS, under PP
(e.g., Ryanair and easyJet), passengers can travel directly from one airport to any other.
Moreover, under MX (e.g., Air France), passengers who travel between two spoke airports
can choose either one-stop or non-stop services, implying that MX is a combination of
HS and PP. Finally, under 2H (e.g., Lufthansa and Air France-KLM group), two hubs
are available for connection, while under 3H, each airport works as a hub.
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Figure 2.2: Box Plots for Airline Network and On-Time Performance (July 2016)
Source: The on-time performance data is from OAG (2016) and airlines’ network structures are from their official websites.
Note: 1. The airline sample includes the top 25 European airlines with their subsidiaries by passenger volume, except
Virgin Atlantic, which does not operate flights within Europe; 2. According to OAG (2016), the on-time performance is
the percentage of flights that depart or arrive within 15 minutes of schedule.
In addition, I assume that the airline’s cost function includes only the expected con-
gestion delay cost. In fact, this cost specification excludes the fixed cost of operating
a flight and the variable cost of serving a passenger. According to Doganis (2009), the
short-run marginal cost of serving an extra passenger on a flight is close to zero. In
addition, Smyth and Pearce (2007) and Pearce (2013) also claim a low marginal cost per
passenger. Thus, we can omit this in order to simplify the analysis. Fixed cost, however,
indeed accounts for a large share of the total cost. Previous literature models fixed cost
to capture the economies of traffic density and then to explain the existence of the hub-
and-spoke network. In fact, modeling the fixed cost will not provide further insights but
will make the model intractable. More importantly, excluding fixed cost can also help us
isolate the impact of the economies of traffic density on airline network choice.
The main trade-offs in the model are between congestion delays and schedule delays
and between flight frequency and travel time. For the former, if the flight frequency in one
route becomes higher, congestion delays in more than one route will increase. However,
passengers’ schedule delays in that route will decrease. For the latter, between two spoke
airports, non-stop services always have lower flight frequency but shorter travel time,
while one-stop services always have higher flight frequency but longer travel time.
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When solving the model, I first consider HS, PP and MX alone in order to compare
them with Lin (2012). Besides the common results, I find, surprisingly, that the airline
may choose PP even when the extra travel time disutility of one-stop services is relatively
low. In fact, this result arises from the inclusion of congestion delays, that is, a negative
network externality. Specifically, on the one hand, because of the traffic concentration of
HS and the convex cost function with respect to flight frequencies, the introduction of
congestion delays, or negative network externality on the cost side, creates a cost disad-
vantage for HS, and thus makes HS less profitable. On the other hand, the introduction of
an omitted negative network externality also reduces the region that makes MX feasible.
Then, there will emerge an interval of extra travel time disutility, in which the disutility
is too high to make HS more profitable and too low to make MX feasible, leaving PP as
the airline’s optimal network structure. The key insight from this result is that including
the omitted negative network externality makes HS and MX less effective than previously
understood as in Lin (2012). In fact, in addition to the commonly received advantage of
PP, that is, saving the extra travel time of connecting at a hub airport, this result might
provide another explanation for why some legacy airlines start to use PP in some local
markets.
I then incorporate 2H into the analysis. I find that, without considering the airline’s
fixed investments of developing a hub airport, 2H will dominate the three other network
structures as long as it is feasible. Because non-stop and one-stop services are imperfectly
substitutable, passengers can obtain higher utility if both non-stop and one-stop services
are available to choose than if only one of them is available. Under 2H, there are two
markets, in which both non-stop and one-stop services are available. Under MX, there
is only one such market. However, under HS and PP, passengers in any market cannot
choose between non-stop and one-stop services. Therefore, because of the exploitation
of horizontal product differentiation to a larger extent, 2H can generate higher passenger
utility and then a higher airline profit than the three other network structures. To
summarize, this result shows the role of horizontal product differentiation in improving
passenger utility and airline profit.
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In fact, this result can also help us understand the multi-hubbing and de-hubbing
phenomena in the airline industry. In reality, we can observe that some airlines develop
new hubs and then use 2H (multi-hubbing), while some others change from 2H to a single
hub network (de-hubbing). Here comes a question: what is the motivation for airlines to
use 2H? One answer is that when an airline’s hub airport is congested, the airline can
develop another hub to reduce the congestion of the previous hub. However, this answer
might not be strong enough because besides 2H, PP and MX can also reduce hub airport
congestion. The result above shows the role of horizontal product differentiation and thus
provides another explanation for the use of 2H.
Moreover, I conduct comparative-static analysis and find that, for the airline under
MX and 2H, there exist some strategic effects when the values of the parameters change,
due to the division of local and connecting traffic in one market. For instance, under MX,
when the marginal congestion delay cost increases, the change of flight frequency between
two spoke airports depends on the trade-off between the direct negative effect of a higher
delay cost and the strategic redistribution of traffic among different routes. Furthermore,
in welfare analysis, I derive not only the first-best, but also the second-best, socially
optimal network structure, and both show the airline’s inefficient biases towards PP and
2H. Besides which, I extend the analysis to 3H and again show the role of horizontal
product differentiation.
The contributions of this chapter are threefold. First, the majority of the airline net-
work choice literature (see Oum et al., 1995; Berechman and Shy, 1998; Kawasaki, 2008)
compare HS and PP alone, with a few others including one more network structure, either
MX (see Lin, 2012) or 2H (see Alderighi et al., 2005). In fact, Starr and Stinchcombe
(1992) and Hendricks et al. (1995, 1999) use rather general models, allowing the network
design to be endogenous. However, their frameworks focus mainly on airline cost but
not on passenger demand, which thus leaves little room for the optimality of network
structures other than HS and PP. Accordingly, this chapter contributes to the literature
by incorporating all possible network structures in a three-city network, each of which
has the potential to be an airline’s optimal network structure.
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Second, most of the previous studies explain airline network choice from the point
of view of the economies of traffic density (see Bittlingmayer, 1990; Hendricks et al.,
1995, 1999), demand uncertainty (see Barla and Constantatos, 2005) and schedule delays
(see Brueckner, 2004), while only Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015) and Silva et al. (2014)
consider congestion delays. Therefore, this chapter contributes to the currently limited
literature available on the effects of congestion delays on airline network choice.
The third is regarding the perspective of analyzing 2H. The conventional wisdom
concerning the function of 2H (see Bilotkach et al., 2013) is to divert passengers from
one hub to another and thus reduce hub airport congestion. In fact, a four-city network
(see Figure 2.3) is the minimum requirement in order to show the congestion reduction
function of 2H; however, this inevitably brings analytical difficulties. To make the anal-




Spoke Airport 1 Spoke Airport 2
Figure 2.3: Commonly Studied Four-City 2-Hub Network
Note: In all network structure figures, solid (resp. dotted) lines represent the existence of non-stop (resp. one-stop)
services.
Nevertheless, in this chapter, I focus on the exploitation of horizontal product differen-
tiation in 2H, which requires a three-city network only. In reality, the horizontal product
differentiation can come from, for instance, different departure time slots (see Encaoua
et al., 1996) and brand loyalty (see Brueckner and Whalen, 2000; Brueckner and Flores-
Fillol, 2007). To see this, one example is the Lufthansa network (see Figure 2.4), in which
Frankfurt and Munich are hub airports and Toulouse is a spoke airport.3 Specifically,
3Concrete examples of other network structures are given in Section 2.7.
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passengers traveling between Toulouse and Frankfurt can take either Lufthansa flights to
arrive directly, or Lufthansa Cityline (a subsidiary of Lufthansa) flights and Lufthansa
flights connecting at Munich. Similarly, passengers traveling between Toulouse and Mu-
nich can take either Lufthansa Cityline flights or Air Dolomiti (a subsidiary of Lufthansa)
flights to arrive directly, or Lufthansa flights connecting at Frankfurt. For different de-
parture time slots, flight schedules between Toulouse and Frankfurt (Munich) provide
evidence (see Section 2.7). For brand loyalty, as shown in Figure 2.4, Lufthansa uses









Figure 2.4: An Example of Three-City 2-Hub Network (Lufthansa)
Related Literature
This chapter is closely related to three branches of literature. Since the airline deregula-
tion in the USA in 1978, there is a growing body of literature on airline network choice,
in which the first branch is the scope of network structures. Previously, the literature has
focused on the choice between HS and PP, but recently there has been a shift towards
some “real-life” network structures, that is, MX and 2H. For MX, among others, Dunn
(2008) empirically examines an airline’s choice of providing non-stop services or not, given
that the airline has (not) provided one-stop services. Moreover, Fageda and Flores-Fillol
(2012) study hub airlines’ incentives to provide non-stop services between spoke airports
under two recent innovations, that is, the regional jet technology and low-cost business
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model. Further, Lin (2012) studies the network choice among HS, PP and MX under both
monopoly and duopoly setups. For 2H, Bilotkach et al. (2013) use the utility function à
la Mussa-Rosen (see Mussa and Rosen, 1978) to study the function of diverting traffic of
2H. Moreover, Wang (2016) theoretically examines the optimality of 2H in the spirit of
Brueckner and Spiller (1991).
The second branch of literature is the theory explaining airline network choice. One
theory is that airlines can better exploit the economies of traffic density under HS. Ac-
cording to Hendricks et al. (1995), the economies of traffic density arise when the cost per
passenger on a route decreases with the number of passengers flying on that route. As a
result, because HS has a higher traffic density than PP, as long as the cost of extra travel
time of one-stop services is not high enough, the total cost for a given level of demand
may be lower under HS than PP. Some empirical studies have confirmed the economies
of traffic density under HS (see Brueckner et al., 1992; Brueckner and Spiller, 1994).
Moreover, besides Hendricks, Piccione, and Tan (1995), theoretical studies explaining
airline network choice from the point of view of the economies of traffic density include,
for example, Bittlingmayer (1990), Oum et al. (1995) and Hendricks et al. (1999) 4.
Another theory concerns demand uncertainty. Barla and Constantatos (2005) show
the flexibility of HS under uncertainty. Interestingly, they also find that both airlines
may choose PP, because by committing not to enjoy the flexibility, airlines can avoid the
spread of competition from one market to others. Furthermore, Hu (2010) also considers
demand uncertainty but under a different setup.
Because passengers greatly value flight frequency (see Berry and Jia, 2010), schedule
delays may be an important factor affecting airline network choice. Berechman and Shy
(1998) and Brueckner and Zhang (2001) first connected airline network structure and
scheduling. Then, Brueckner (2004) builds a framework that improves upon the previous
two studies and shows that a high disutility of schedule delays would be conducive to HS.
In addition, other relevant studies include Kawasaki (2008) and Flores-Fillol (2009).
Furthermore, some studies have introduced congestion delays into their models. In
4Hendricks et al. (1999) also consider the nature of competition, that is, airlines compete aggressively
or not.
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Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015), they find that, even if there is a higher delay cost, duopoly
airlines exhibit a preference for HS, which may be inefficient from the perspective of a
welfare-maximizing social planner. Moreover, Silva et al. (2014) also consider congestion
delays and show that a higher value of travel time favors PP. However, the frameworks of
these two studies do not allow for the analysis of MX and 2H. Besides which, in Fageda
and Flores-Fillol (2015), passenger demand is also perfectly inelastic.
The last theory is the horizontal product differentiation. Lin (2012) finds that HS
will be the airline’s optimal network structure if passengers do not differentiate between
non-stop and one-stop services too much, and if the extra travel time disutility of one-
stop services is low. However, if the passenger differentiation is substantial, MX (resp.
PP) will be the airline’s optimal network structure when the extra travel time disutility
is low (resp. high).
The third branch of literature is the modeling of vertical and horizontal product
differentiation. With respect to the vertical product differentiation, Flores-Fillol (2010)
considers that airlines may compete in flight frequencies. Moreover, in the models of
Brueckner (2004) and Kawasaki (2008), one-stop services always cost more time than
non-stop services. With respect to the horizontal product differentiation, Encaoua et al.
(1996) consider the difference of the departure time slot, while Brueckner and Whalen
(2000) and Brueckner and Flores-Fillol (2007) consider brand loyalty. In addition, Lin
(2012) uses the quadratic utility function in Dixit (1979) to capture the horizontal product
differentiation.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model. Sec-
tion 2.3 derives the market outcome, which includes comparisons within each network
structure and across different network structures, as well as comparative statics. Section
2.4 compares the airline’s optimal network structure with the first-best and second-best
socially optimal network structures. Section 2.5 extends the analysis to the 3-hub net-
work. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 The Model
In this model, I consider three symmetrically-located airports (cities), K, A and B, in
which all of them are capacity-constrained and K and A can work as hub airports. Pas-
sengers who wish to travel between city pairs form markets AK, BK and AB, denoted
by markets 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The airline can choose from amongst four network
structures, that is, a hub-and-spoke network (HS), point-to-point network (PP), mixed
network (MX), and a 2-hub network (2H). Moreover, for completeness, I study a 3-hub
network (3H), or an all-hub network, as an extension.
2.2.1 Passengers
Assume that there exists one representative passenger in each market. Following Dixit
(1979), the passenger utility in market i (∈ {1, 2, 3}) is:









2 + 2γQ0Q1 + β1 (Q1)
2)
. (2.1)
In (2.1), Q0 is the traffic of non-stop services and Q1 is the traffic of one-stop services.
The concavity of passenger utility with respect to Q0 and Q1 requires β0 > 0, β1 > 0,
and γ2 6 β0β1. Moreover, the parameter γ > 0 represents the passenger differentiation
between non-stop and one-stop services. The greater γ is, the higher the degree of
substitution will be between non-stop and one-stop services. To simplify the algebra, I
assume β0 = β1 = 1 and γ =
1
2
.5 Besides, αi0 and α
i
1 are the marginal utility of local and
connecting traffic, respectively, with:
αi0 = v + λF
i, (2.2)






5If we relax the assumptions for β0, β1 and γ, the degree of substitutability between non-stop and
one-stop services will change, and thus the region that a network structure is optimal for the airline may
enlarge or shrink. However, all of the properties and intuitions found in this chapter will not be affected.
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In (2.2) and (2.3), v ∈ R++ is the passenger’s travel benefit. F i is the flight frequency
between the city pair of market i, and t ∈ R++ is the extra travel time disutility, in which
the extra travel time of one-stop services includes both the extra in-aircraft travel time
compared to non-stop services and the layover time at the hub airport. The parameter
λ ∈ R++ is positively related to the marginal benefit of schedule delay reduction and






delay reduction benefits of non-stop and one-stop services, respectively. In particular,
following Lin (2012), the schedule delay reduction of one-stop services takes the average
of two relevant flight frequencies. Another method is to take the minimum; however this
is problematic if we consider the layover time at the hub airport (see Rietveld and Brons,
2001).
Following Singh and Vives (1984), the passenger surplus in market i (∈ {1, 2, 3}) is
the difference between passenger utility and total payment:
U i (Q0, Q1)−
∑
τ∈{0,1}
P iτQτ . (2.4)
In (2.4), P iτ (τ = 0, 1) are the fares of non-stop and one-stop services, respectively.
Next, passengers’ demand for each network structure is discussed.
2.2.1.1 Hub-and-Spoke Network
Under HS (Figure 2.5), K is a hub airport and A and B are spoke airports. Then, under
HS, passengers in markets AK and BK can choose non-stop services only, and their
marginal utility of local traffic is αi0 = v + λf
i
HS, in which f
i
HS is the flight frequency
between the city pair of market i (∈ {1, 2}). Moreover, the passenger in market AB can
choose one-stop services connecting at K only, and his/her marginal utility of connecting







After observing fares and flight frequencies, the representative passenger in each mar-
ket chooses traffic in order to maximize passenger surplus. Then, passengers’ optimal











Figure 2.5: Hub-and-Spoke Network
choices give the following inverse demand functions:
piHS = v + λf
i
HS − qiHS (i = 1, 2), (2.5)






− t− q3HS. (2.6)
In (2.5) and (2.6), piHS and q
i
HS (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are the fares and traffic in markets AK,
BK and AB, respectively.
2.2.1.2 Point-to-Point Network
Under PP (Figure 2.6), all airports are identical. Then, under PP, all passengers can
choose non-stop services only, and their marginal utility of local traffic is α0 = v+ λf
i
PP ,










Figure 2.6: Point-to-Point Network
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The inverse demand functions will then be:
piPP = v + λf
i
PP − qiPP . (2.7)
In (2.7), piPP and q
i
PP (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are the fares and traffic in markets AK, BK and AB,
respectively.
2.2.1.3 Mixed Network
Under MX (Figure 2.7), K is a hub airport and A and B are spoke airports. Then, under
MX, passengers in markets AK and BK can choose non-stop services only, and their
marginal utility of local traffic is αi0 = v + λf
i
MX , in which f
i
MX is the flight frequency
between the city pair of market i (∈ {1, 2}). Moreover, the passenger in market AB can
choose not only non-stop services between A and B but also one-stop services connecting
at K, with the marginal utility of local traffic α30 = v + λf
3
MX and connecting traffic





















Figure 2.7: Mixed Network
6Under PP, theoretically, the passenger in market AB may buy tickets for routes AK and BK and thus
has “one-stop services”. However, the scheduling of flights in routes AK and BK can be a problem for this
possibility. For example, when the passenger arrives at K, flights from K to B may have already departed.
Under MX, this problem does not exist because of the coordination of flight schedules. Therefore, the
scheduling of flights is a key difference between PP and MX.
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The inverse demand functions will then be:
piMX = v + λf
i
MX − qiMX , (2.8)
p30MX = v + λf
3












q30MX − q31MX . (2.10)
In (2.8), piMX and q
i
MX (i ∈ {1, 2}) are the fares and traffic in markets AK and BK,




MX , and q
31
MX are the fares and traffic of
local and connecting traffic in market AB, respectively. In particular, the notation j0
represents non-stop services and j1 represents one-stop services for market j. We will use
this style of notation hereafter.
2.2.1.4 2-Hub Network
Under 2H (Figure 2.8), K and A are hub airports and B is a spoke airport. Then, under
2H, the passenger in market AK can choose non-stop services only, and his/her marginal
utility of local traffic is α10 = v + λf
1
2H , in which f
1
2H is the flight frequency between the
city pair of market AK. Moreover, passengers in markets BK and AB can choose not
only non-stop services between B and K and between A and B, respectively, but also
one-stop services connecting at A and K, respectively, with the marginal utility of local
traffic αi0 = v + λf
i
2H and connecting traffic α
i






− t, in which f i2H
is the flight frequency between the city pair of market i (∈ {2, 3}).
The inverse demand functions will then be:
p12H = v + λf
1
2H − q12H , (2.11)
pi02H = v + λf
i












qi02H − qi12H . (2.13)
In (2.11), p12H and q
1
2H are the fare and traffic in market AK, respectively. In (2.12) and




2H , and q
i1
2H (i ∈ {2, 3}) are the fares and traffic of local and connecting

















Figure 2.8: 2-Hub Network
traffic in markets BK and AB, respectively.
2.2.2 The Airline
For the airline’s cost function, I assume that it includes the expected congestion delay
cost only.7 Specifically, the airline’s cost is based on route, and the expected congestion
delay cost of a flight in route n is proportional to the total number of aircraft movements





in which ηmn is a network-specific parameter with ηmn ∈ N.8 In (2.14), the parameter
ψ ∈ R++ is positively related to the marginal congestion delay cost and is hereafter used
as the proxy of the latter.
Next, I discuss the airline’s cost for each network structure. Under HS, the numbers
7In fact, passengers also endure some level of disutility from congestion delays. However, because
omitting the impact of congestion delays on passengers does not affect the insights of the model but
makes the model more tractable, I only consider the negative effect of congestion delays on the airline.
8For the literature on delay function, among others, Brueckner (2002, 2005) models the delay cost
as a non-decreasing function of the number of flights during the peak travel period of a day. Moreover,
US Federal Aviation Administration (1969) models delays as a convex function of the number of flights.
This delay function is estimated from steady-state queuing theory and has been used by Morrison (1987),
Zhang and Zhang (1997, 2003, 2006) and Basso (2008). Pels and Verhoef (2004), De Borger and Van
Dender (2006), Basso and Zhang (2007), and Yang and Zhang (2011) use a linear delay function. In this
chapter, following Brueckner and Van Dender (2008) and Flores-Fillol (2010), I collapse the peak and
off-peak travel periods, as in Brueckner (2002, 2005), into a single travel period, in which delays always
exist.
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Thus, the total number of aircraft movements between the city pair of market i (∈ {1, 2})
is 2f iHS + f
j
HS (j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}). Then, the expected congestion delay cost for each flight
is ψ
(





Under PP, the numbers of aircraft movements at airports A, B and K are f 1PP + f
3
PP ,






PP , respectively. Thus, the total number of aircraft movements




PP . Then, the









the cost structures of MX and 2H are the same as PP.
The airline’s objective is to maximize profit by choosing a network structure, flight
frequencies, and traffic. For convenience of exposition, I solve the optimization problem
sequentially as for a dynamic model (see the timeline in Figure 2.9). That is, given a
chosen network structure, I derive the airline’s optimal decision on flight frequencies and
traffic. Then, I consider the airline’s optimal network structure.
The airline chooses a
network structure
The airline chooses flight
frequencies and traffic
Figure 2.9: Timeline
Finally, following Brueckner (2004), I assume that the load factor of each flight equals
100 percent. In fact, the analysis will be the same if we fix a load factor realistically less





is implicitly determined if the airline selects the optimal flight frequency f and traffic q.
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2.3 Market Outcome
2.3.1 Flight Frequencies and Traffic
I first consider the airline’s optimal decision on flight frequencies and traffic, given a
chosen network structure.
2.3.1.1 Hub-and-Spoke Network
Let πHS : R
5
+ → R1 be a C2 function of ΩHS = (f 1HS, f 2HS, q1HS, q2HS, q3HS). The airline










































The process of solving (2.16) is to first omit the non-arbitrage condition, then derive
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions, and finally to examine the satisfaction of the omitted con-
dition. In fact, I show in the appendix that the only candidate for the optimum is the
interior solution. For the second-order condition, making the Hessian D2πHS negative
definite for all ΩHS ∈ R5++ requires ψ ∈ (ψsocHS,+∞), in which ψsocHS = λ
2
4
. Moreover, I also
show that the optimal solution is a unique global maximizer of πHS on R
5
++. All details
of derivation and proof are in Section 2.8.1.1.
In addition, under ψ ∈ (ψsocHS,+∞), the constraint of extra travel time disutility t to




, in which tHS =
12ψv
12ψ−λ2 , coming from q
3∗
HS > 0.
In fact, if the extra travel time disutility becomes too high, the passenger in market AB
cannot obtain positive utility from choosing one-stop services, and thus the airline has
no interest in providing the service, implying q3∗HS → 0.
9There is in fact another type of possible arbitrage, that is, passengers buy a connecting ticket but
use only one portion. According to Hendricks et al. (1997) and Barla and Constantatos (2005), airlines
can easily stop this practice. Thus, this type of arbitrage is not considered here.
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I also compare variables within HS and find that all variables in market AK are equal
to those in market BK, respectively. This result comes from the symmetry of these two






HS (i ∈ {1, 2}). Indeed, we can
explain these results by the following first-order condition:
∂πHS
∂qiHS
= v + λf iHS − 2qiHS = 0, (2.17)
∂πHS
∂q3HS






− t− 2q3HS = 0. (2.18)





q3∗HS comes directly from the fact that the passenger in market AB has to endure the extra
travel time disutility and thus has a lower willingness-to-pay. Then, for the passenger
in market AB, the downward shift of demand curve from the extra travel time disutility
dominates the upward movement along the curve due to lower traffic. Thus, we can




Let πPP : R
6
+ → R1 be a C2 function of ΩPP = (f iPP , qiPP ) (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}). The airline






























subject to f iPP , q
i
PP > 0 (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}). (2.19)
The second-order condition for solving (2.19) requires ψ ∈ (ψsocPP ,+∞), in which ψsocPP =
λ2
4
. All details of derivation and proof are in Section 2.8.1.2. Moreover, under ψ ∈
(ψsocPP ,+∞), all variables are positive and symmetric across three markets.
2.3.1.3 Mixed Network
Then, let πMX : R
7
+ → R1 be a C2 function of ΩMX = (f 1MX , f 2MX , f 3MX , q1MX , q2MX , q30MX , q31MX).
The airline maximizes profit subject to a non-arbitrage condition and seven non-negativity

































































. All details of derivation and proof are in Section 2.8.1.3.
In addition, under ψ ∈ (ψsocMX ,+∞), the constraint of extra travel time disutility t




, in which tMX =
(4ψ+3λ2)v
20ψ−λ2 and tMX =
8ψv
16ψ−λ2 , coming from f
3∗
MX > 0 and q
31∗
MX > 0, respectively. In fact, if the extra travel
time disutility becomes too low, the disadvantage of one-stop services will become less
significant, implying f 3∗MX → 0. However, if the extra travel time disutility becomes too
high, the passenger in market AB cannot obtain positive utility from choosing one-stop
services, and thus the airline has no interest in providing the service, implying q31∗MX → 0.
I also compare variables within MX and find that all variables in market AK are equal
to those in market BK, respectively. This result comes from the symmetry of these two

























= s3∗MX (i ∈ {1, 2}).
We can in fact explain f i∗MX > f
3∗


















 = 0, (2.21)
∂πMX
∂f 3MX







 = 0. (2.22)
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According to (2.21) and (2.22),
f i∗MX > f
3∗
MX ⇔ qi∗MX +
q31∗MX
2
> q30∗MX , (2.23)
in which the latter holds (unsurprisingly, given the nature of traffic). That is, the disper-
sion of traffic in market AB makes the local traffic in market AB lower than the sum of
the total traffic in market i and half of the connecting traffic in market AB.10 Intuitively,
the increase in flight frequency can raise the willingness-to-pay of passengers. Then, if
the traffic effectively paying the increased fare between the city pair of market i is higher
than that between the city pair of market AB, the marginal benefit of f iMX will be greater






> λq30∗MX . Therefore, f
i∗
MX should be higher
than f 3∗MX to balance the marginal benefit and cost.
Analogously, qi∗MX > q
30∗
MX also comes from the dispersion of traffic in market AB. This
dispersion pushes the flight frequency of non-stop services for market AB down and thus
reduces the willingness-to-pay of local traffic in market AB. In addition, the substitution
of connecting traffic in market AB can also reduce q30∗MX .
For q30∗MX > q
31∗
MX , the effect of extra travel time disutility endured by the connecting
traffic dominates the more significant schedule delay reduction. Thus, the willingness-to-
pay of local traffic in market AB is higher than that of connecting traffic, and then q30∗MX
will be set higher than q31∗MX .
Moreover, the comparison of fares comes from the relationship between the shift of
demand curve, for various reasons discussed above, and the movement along the demand
curve due to higher or lower traffic. Finally, the comparison of aircraft sizes shows that
the airline optimally uses smaller aircraft between A (B) and K in order to significantly
increase flight frequency and thus reduce passengers’ schedule delays.
10Half of the connecting traffic in market AB comes from the fact that flights between the city pair of
markets AK and BK carry the connecting traffic in market AB together.
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2.3.1.4 2-Hub Network
Then, let π2H : R
8
+ → R1 be a C2 function of Ω2H = (f 12H , f 22H , f 32H , q12H , q202H , q212H , q302H , q312H).
The airline maximizes profit subject to two non-arbitrage conditions and eight non-

















































2H (i ∈ {2, 3} , j ∈ {2, 3} \ {i}),















The second-order condition for solving (2.24) requires ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), in which ψsoc2H =
7λ2
12
. All details of derivation and proof are in Section 2.8.1.4.
In addition, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the constraint of extra travel time disutility t to


















, coming from f i∗2H > 0 and q
i1∗
2H > 0 (i ∈ {2, 3}), respectively.




. Between airports B and K (A), there exist both
local and connecting traffic. Furthermore, the local traffic involves one flight, while the
connecting traffic involves two flights. Thus, when the marginal congestion delay cost






, the airline will prefer the local traffic. As a
result, for any extra travel time disutility, flight frequencies between airports B and K







, if the extra travel time disutility becomes lower, the local traffic will
decrease because the disadvantage of one-stop services becomes less significant. However,
the connecting traffic is uncertain because on the one hand, the lower extra travel time
disutility will make one-stop services more attractive, while on the other hand, due to the
existence of the demand side network effect, the decrease in local traffic will weaken the
schedule delay reduction and subsequently make one-stop services less attractive. In this
model, the effect of the decrease in local traffic dominates that of lower extra travel time
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disutility. Hence, if the extra travel time disutility becomes lower, the connecting traffic
will also decrease. Therefore, both the decrease in local and connecting traffic resulting
from the lower t will impel f i∗2H → 0.
Then, for t < t2H , if the extra travel time disutility is too high, passengers in markets
BK and AB cannot obtain positive utility from choosing one-stop services, and thus the
airline has no interest in providing the service, implying qi1∗2H → 0.
I also compare variables within 2H and find that all variables in market BK are equal
to those in market AB, respectively. This result comes from the symmetry of these two




2H > max {qi0∗2H , qi1∗2H}, p1∗2H > max {pi0∗2H , pi1∗2H},






2H if and only if t >
16λ2ψv
192ψ2−52λ2ψ+3λ4 , as well as the comparison
















= si∗2H (i ∈ {2, 3} and j ∈ {2, 3} \ {i}).
In fact, explanations for these comparisons are essentially the same as those in MX,
except that the effect of extra travel time disutility no longer always dominates.
2.3.1.5 Comparative Statics
Table 2.1 presents the comparative statics of HS and PP. For HS, the increase in pas-
senger’s travel benefit v can raise the passenger’s willingness-to-pay, and thus raise the
marginal benefit of serving one more unit of traffic. The traffic will then increase with
v. Moreover, higher traffic implies a higher marginal benefit of flight frequency. Then,
flight frequencies will increase with v. For fares, the upward shift of demand curve from
a higher travel benefit and flight frequency dominates the downward movement along the
curve due to higher traffic. Then, fares will increase with v. Furthermore, as the airline
can extract more surplus if passengers can enjoy more benefits from travel and passenger
surplus is in fact an increasing function of traffic, the airline’s profit, passenger surplus
and social welfare will all increase with v. Otherwise, according to Table 2.1, under HS,
flight frequency is less volatile than traffic when v changes. Thus, the aircraft size will
become larger when v increases. We can then analyze the effect of extra travel time
disutility t analogously.
The same logic can also apply to the effect of the marginal benefit of schedule delay
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reduction λ. Thus, all variables except aircraft size increase with λ. In particular, for
the aircraft size under HS, a higher λ will provide the airline with a direct motivation to
increase flight frequency. Thus, when λ increases, the extent to which flight frequency
increases is larger than traffic and then the aircraft size will decrease.
In addition, the effect of marginal congestion delay cost ψ comes from the fact that
it can raise the airline’s cost. As a result, all variables except aircraft size decrease with
ψ. In particular, for the aircraft size under HS, a higher ψ will provide the airline with
a direct motivation to decrease flight frequency. Thus, when ψ increases, the extent that
flight frequency decreases is larger than traffic and then the aircraft size will increase.
For PP, the only difference compared to HS is that the aircraft size is independent of
v. This result comes from the fact that PP does not relate to t, and thus both traffic and
flight frequency are proportional to v.
HS v t λ ψ PP v λ ψ
f1∗HS + - + - f
1∗
PP + + -
q1∗HS + - + - q
1∗
PP + + -
q3∗HS + - + - p
1∗
PP + + -
p1∗HS + - + - π
1∗
PP + + -
p3∗HS + - + - ps
1∗
PP + + -
π∗HS + - + - 3ps
1∗
PP + + -
ps1∗HS + - + - sw
1∗
PP + + -
ps3∗HS + - + - s
1∗
PP 0 - +
2ps1∗HS + ps
3∗
HS + - + -
sw∗HS + - + -
s1∗HS + - - +
Table 2.1: Comparative Statics of HS and PP
Table 2.2 presents the comparative statics of MX. All critical values in Table 2.2, as
well as Table 2.3, are given in Table 2.15 in Section 2.10. For MX, compared to HS and
PP, the effect of parameters is reversed on some variables. In fact, this new pattern is
essentially due to the fact that MX is a network structure that involves the division of
local and connecting traffic in one market.
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Let us use the effect of ψ on f 3MX as an example to illustrate this pattern. When
ψ increases, operating flights for local traffic becomes costly and then f 3MX will become
lower. This mechanism shows the direct effect of ψ. However, in market AB, the local
traffic involves one flight, while the connecting traffic involves two flights. Thus, when ψ
increases, allocating more traffic to non-stop services is more cost efficient and then f 3MX
will become higher. This mechanism shows the strategic effect of ψ. Therefore, when ψ
increases, the eventual change of f 3MX depends on the trade-off between the direct and
strategic effects. Then, if t is relatively high, that is, t > t5MX , the connecting traffic in
market AB is already low and thus the strategic effect will be too weak to dominate the
direct effect, implying that f 3MX will become lower when ψ increases. However, if t is
relatively low, that is, t < t5MX , the connecting traffic in market AB is significant and
thus the strategic effect will be strong enough to dominate the direct effect, implying
that f 3MX will become higher when ψ increases. From the above analysis, we see that the
division of traffic gives the airline more flexibility in the decision-making process.
MX v t λ ψ
f1∗MX + - + -
f3∗MX - + + iff t > t
3
MX + iff t < t
5
MX
q1∗MX + - + -
q30∗MX + iff ψ >
3λ2
4 + - iff t < t
4
MX + iff t < t
4
MX
q31∗MX + - + -
p1∗MX + - + -
p30∗MX + iff ψ >
7λ2
12 + - iff t < t
5
MX + iff t < t
5
MX
p31∗MX + - + -
π∗MX + - + -
ps1∗MX + - + -
ps3∗MX + iff t < t
1
MX + iff t > t
2
MX - iff t < t
6





MX + - + -
sw∗MX + - + -
s1∗MX - + - +
s3∗MX + - + iff t < t
7
MX + iff t > t
8
MX
Table 2.2: Comparative Statics of MX
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Table 2.3 presents the comparative statics of 2H and shows similar patterns to MX.
2H v t λ ψ
f1∗2H + - + -
f2∗2H + iff ψ >
5λ2
4 + + iff t > t
2
2H + iff t < t
4
2H
q1∗2H + - + -
q20∗2H + + - iff t < t
3
2H + iff t < t
3
2H
q21∗2H + - + -
p1∗2H + - + -
p20∗2H + + - iff t < t
4
2H + iff t < t
4
2H
p21∗2H + - + -
π∗2H + - + -
ps1∗2H + - + -





2H + - + -
sw∗2H + - + -
s1∗2H - + - +
s2∗2H + - + iff t < t
5
2H + iff t > t
6
2H
Table 2.3: Comparative Statics of 2H
2.3.2 Network Structure
I next consider which network structure will bring the airline the highest profit. To
compare with the literature, I first focus on HS, PP and MX. I then incorporate 2H
into the analysis to examine the airline’s optimal network structure under four network
structures. Note that in market outcome analysis, the parameter space is ψ ∈ (ψsocHS,+∞)
for comparing HS and PP, ψ ∈ (ψsocMX ,+∞) for comparing HS, PP and MX, and ψ ∈
(ψsoc2H ,+∞) for comparing HS, PP, MX, and 2H.
2.3.2.1 Comparison Between HS and PP
First, I compare the important variables between HS and PP, some of which are crucial
in order to understand the comparison of profits, and some, for example, the total flight
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frequency and aircraft size, are indeed important issues in the literature. For all of the
following propositions, I will only provide the proofs that are essential to the derivation
of the main conclusions in the appendix.11 Nonetheless, I provide all critical values in



















, we have Proposition 2.1.
Proposition 2.1.
1. The flight frequency under HS is higher than PP, that is, f 1∗HS > f
1∗
PP .
2. The total flight frequency and total cost under HS are higher than PP, respectively,












3. The traffic and fare in markets AK and BK under HS are higher than PP, respec-







4. The traffic and fare in market AB under HS are higher than PP, respectively, that






PP , if and only if t ∈ (0, t1HS∼PP ).
5. The aircraft size under HS is smaller than PP, that is, s1∗HS < s
1∗
PP .











According to Proposition 2.1, generally speaking, passengers in most of the markets
face higher flight frequencies and fares, while the airline faces a higher cost under HS
than PP. Then, first, f 1∗HS > f
1∗
PP is a classic result in the literature (see Brueckner, 2004)
but the interpretation is different in this model because of the existence of congestion































⇒ λq1∗PP − 8ψf 1∗PP = 0. (2.26)
In (2.25) and (2.26), intuitively, the increase in flight frequency can raise the willingness-
11Other proofs are available upon request.
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to-pay of passengers. Then, because of the pooling of traffic under HS, the traffic effec-
tively paying the increased fare between the city pair of markets AK or BK under HS is
higher than that between the city pair of any market under PP. Thus, the marginal bene-
fit of f 1HS will be greater than that of f
1






> λq1∗PP . Moreover, the
existence of congestion delays makes the marginal cost of flight frequency less sensitive
to flight frequency under HS than PP. Therefore, f 1∗HS should be higher than f
1∗
PP in order
to balance the higher marginal benefit and the lower sensitivity of marginal cost under
HS.






which in fact includes all relevant cases. Specifically, the higher total flight frequency
under HS stands in stark contrast to one of the core assumptions in Brueckner (2004)
and Fageda and Flores-Fillol (2015), in which they justify their position by arguing that
under HS, the airline operates fewer routes and thus naturally provides a lower total
flight frequency. In this model, because of the existence of congestion delays and the
consequent lower sensitivity of marginal cost under HS, the total flight frequency of two
routes under HS can be so high that it exceeds the total flight frequency of three routes
under PP. Moreover, 6ψ (f 1∗HS)
2
> 12ψ (f 1∗PP )
2
results directly from 2f 1∗HS > 3f
1∗
PP .
Then, we can also use first-order conditions to explain the comparison of traffic:
∂πHS
∂q1HS
= v + λf 1HS − 2q1HS = 0, (2.27)
∂πPP
∂q1PP
= v + λf 1PP − 2q1PP = 0. (2.28)
In (2.27) and (2.28), q1∗HS > q
1∗
PP comes directly from the more significant schedule delay
reduction under HS. For p1∗HS > p
1∗
PP , compared to PP, under HS, the upward shift of
demand curve from a higher flight frequency dominates the downward movement along
the curve due to higher traffic. In any case, we can interpret the comparison between
q3∗HS and q
1∗




PP analogously, except that the extra travel time
disutility can significantly reduce the willingness-to-pay of the passenger in market AB.
In particular, what is also surprising is s1∗HS < s
1∗
PP , which is totally contrary to the
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previous literature (see Brueckner (2004)). Conventional wisdom suggests that HS can
efficiently employ the economies of traffic density by using larger aircraft in order to save
cost. However, results in this model show that HS may also be more profitable by signif-
icantly increasing flight frequency and thus reducing the schedule delays of passengers.
In this way, using smaller aircraft can be the airline’s optimal strategy. Finally, another
consequence of the significantly higher flight frequency under HS is the higher cost per
passenger shown in the last point, which is also contrary to the literature.
Then, the comparison between π∗HS and π
∗
PP gives Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.2. Under ψ ∈ (ψsocHS,+∞), for the airline, HS is more profitable than PP
if and only if t ∈ (0, tπHS∼PP ].
Proof. In Section 2.8.2.1.
Proposition 2.2 is shown in Figure 2.10. To interpret this, we decompose the difference
of π∗HS and π
∗
PP as the difference of schedule delay reduction, extra travel time disutility,
the rest of margin, and total cost, which are positive, positive, negative, and positive,

















Figure 2.10: Comparison of Profits Between HS and PP
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π∗HS − π∗PP = κSDRHS − κSDRPP︸ ︷︷ ︸
Difference of Schedule Delay Reduction
− tq2∗HS︸︷︷︸
Difference of Extra Travel Time Disutility
+ κRMHS − κRMPP︸ ︷︷ ︸

















































Then, for given values of the passenger’s travel benefit v and the marginal benefit
of schedule delay reduction λ, I will discuss the comparison between π∗HS and π
∗
PP by
considering the marginal congestion delay cost ψ and the extra travel time disutility t.
Let us first fix ψ and explain the choice of network structure if t increases. According
to Proposition 2.2, given a marginal congestion delay cost, HS is more profitable if the
extra travel time disutility is low and PP is more profitable otherwise. Under HS, if the
extra travel time disutility is low, the passenger in market AB does not have to endure
a considerable loss when connecting at the hub, and thus there will be high traffic of
one-stop services. Meanwhile, according to (2.25), the high traffic in market AB will
increase the marginal benefit of flight frequency and consequently motivate the airline to
set a high flight frequency. Furthermore, as in (2.27), a high flight frequency will enable
passengers in markets AK and BK to enjoy a more significant schedule delay reduction,
and as a result there will also be high traffic of non-stop services. In fact, this process
shows the mechanism of the demand side network effect.
Therefore, if the extra travel time disutility t is low, even though HS endures the loss
of passengers, which is due first to the existence of extra travel time disutility that does
not relate to PP, second, as it incurs a higher total cost than PP, and third, as it obtains
a lower value of the rest of margin, as in (2.29), it can still exert its advantage of reducing
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schedule delays sufficiently and will thus be more profitable than PP. However, if the
extra travel time disutility becomes high, connecting at the hub will greatly reduce the
utility of the passenger in market AB, and the benefit from reducing schedule delays will
also become very weak. In this way, HS cannot be more profitable.
Let us then fix t and explain the choice of network structure if ψ increases. Obviously,
if the extra travel time disutility t is high enough, PP is always more profitable than HS,
as discussed above. Nevertheless, given the relatively low extra travel time disutility, as
the marginal congestion delay cost ψ increases, first, HS is more profitable and then PP is
more profitable. In fact, a relatively low marginal congestion delay cost will motivate the
airline under HS to set high flight frequency in order to sufficiently enjoy the advantage of
schedule delay reduction. The advantage of schedule delay reduction of HS will dominate
the three disadvantages, and thus HS will be more profitable. However, when the marginal
congestion delay cost becomes high, maintaining high flight frequency becomes more
costly. This change will motivate the airline under HS to reduce flight frequency, and the
advantage of schedule delay reduction of HS will be dominated by the three disadvantages.
Hence, PP will be more profitable.
2.3.2.2 Comparison Between HS (PP) and MX












, we have Proposition 2.3.
Proposition 2.3. Table 2.4 summarizes the comparison of variables between HS (PP)
and MX.
According to Proposition 2.3, compared to HS and PP, passengers in markets AK and
BK under MX face an intermediate flight frequency and fare, while the airline under MX
faces an intermediate cost. This result arises due to the fact that MX is a combination
of HS and PP. Thus, variables under MX are not as high as HS and not as low as PP.
Specifically, results in Proposition 2.3 can essentially be explained by the same ap-
proach as in Proposition 2.1. Thus, only the comparison of aircraft sizes between HS and
MX will be discussed. For MX, a central problem is to allocate the traffic of market AB
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HS vs MX PP vs MX
Markets AK/BK AB AK/BK AB




































































































Aircraft Size s1∗HS < s
1∗













Table 2.4: Comparison of Variables Between HS (PP) and MX
between non-stop and one-stop services. Specifically, if the extra travel time disutility
t is low, the airline has a stronger motivation to attract passengers to choose one-stop
services. As a result, between city pairs of markets AK and BK, using small aircraft to
increase flight frequency and then to reduce passengers’ schedule delays is the airline’s
optimal strategy. We then obtain s1∗HS > s
1∗
MX . Otherwise, such motivation is weak and
thus s1∗HS < s
1∗
MX is possible. Moreover, because of the limited scale of non-stop services
of market AB under MX, using larger aircraft to decrease flight frequency and reduce
congestion delay cost is the airline’s optimal strategy. We then obtain s1∗HS < s
3∗
MX .
The comparison between π∗HS (π
∗
PP ) and π
∗
MX gives Proposition 2.4.
Proposition 2.4. Under ψ ∈ (ψsocMX ,+∞), for the airline:
















Proof. In Section 2.8.2.2.
Figures of Proposition 2.4 are in Section 2.8.2.2. According to Proposition 2.4, without
considering the airline’s fixed investments of developing a hub airport, MX will dominate
HS and PP as long as it is feasible.12 Because non-stop and one-stop services are imper-
fectly substitutable, passengers can obtain higher utility if both non-stop and one-stop
12The reason I do not model the airline’s fixed investments of developing a hub airport is the concern
of tractability. However, in spite of this limitation, we can gain a better understanding of the role of
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services are available to choose than if only one of them is available. Under MX, there
is one market, in which both non-stop and one-stop services are available. However, un-
der HS and PP, passengers in any market cannot choose between non-stop and one-stop
services. Therefore, because of the exploitation of horizontal product differentiation, MX
can generate higher passenger utility and then a higher airline profit than HS and PP
as long as it is feasible. Moreover, when MX is no longer feasible, HS and PP are the
only available choices. To summarize, this result shows the role of horizontal product
differentiation in improving passenger utility and airline profit.
2.3.2.3 The Airline’s Optimal Network Structure (HS, PP and MX)
I then compare π∗HS, π
∗
PP , and π
∗
MX with each other and provide the airline’s optimal
network structure from amongst HS, PP and MX in Proposition 2.5.
Proposition 2.5. Considering only HS, PP and MX, under ψ ∈ (ψsocMX ,+∞), the air-











Proof. In Section 2.8.2.3.
Proposition 2.5 is shown in Figure 2.11. According to the intuition from Proposition
2.2 and 2.4, if the extra travel time disutility t is low, focusing on one-stop services in
market AB can sufficiently use the schedule delay reduction without losing a lot of traffic,
and thus HS will be the airline’s optimal network structure. However, if the extra travel
time disutility is high, focusing on non-stop services in market AB can efficiently keep
the traffic, and thus PP will be the airline’s optimal network structure.
For the rest of the region, MX (resp. PP) will be the airline’s optimal network
structure if the extra travel time disutility t is relatively high (resp. low). This result is
somewhat contrary to the conventional wisdom that an airline prefers PP only if the extra
travel time disutility is high (see Lin (2012)). In fact, the region we are discussing is the
horizontal product differentiation in airline network choice from this chapter. In fact, if we model the
fixed investments, the network structures with fewer hubs will be favored more by the airline, while all
of the properties and intuitions found in this chapter will not be affected.
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intermediate extra travel time disutility, which is not high enough to greatly reduce the
utility of the passenger in market AB who connects at the hub. Intuitively, if the extra
travel time disutility is relatively high, MX is feasible. Then, because of the exploitation
of horizontal product differentiation, MX will be the airline’s optimal network structure.
However, if the extra travel time disutility is relatively low, the flight frequency between
the city pair of market AB under MX cannot be positive, while HS cannot also be more
profitable than PP. Thus, PP will be the airline’s optimal network structure. I will then
explain why, in this model, PP can be the airline’s optimal network structure even when
the extra travel time disutility is relatively low, while it cannot be in Lin (2012).













Figure 2.11: The Airline’s Optimal Network Structure (HS, PP and MX)
In Lin (2012), letting t̂πHS∼PP denote the indifference curve of HS and PP, t̂HS denote
the upper bound of extra travel time disutility t̂ of HS and t̂MX and t̂MX denote the lower




















. Then, given the order of critical values 0 < t̂MX < t̂
π
HS∼PP < t̂MX < t̂HS,














Therefore, as shown in Proposition 2.5, the new result in this model comes from the
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fact that the indifference curve of HS and PP is below the lower bound of MX, instead of
between the bounds of MX. In fact, the different relative positions of curves and bounds
result essentially from different cost functions. Without considering congestion delays, as
in Lin (2012), the airline’s cost for one route depends on the flight frequency of this route
only. However, in this model, in considering congestion delays, that is, a negative network
externality, the airline’s cost for one route depends on not only the flight frequency of
this route but also those of other routes. Next, I analyze how different cost functions
affect the indifference curve of HS and PP and the bounds of MX.

































respectively. In this way, δHS = δPP = 0 is the case of Lin (2012) and δHS = δPP = 1
is the case of this model. Given (2.30) and (2.31), we can obtain the general form of
indifference curve of HS and PP:
t̃πHS∼PP =
v
4ψ (1 + 2δHS)− λ2
{4ψ (1 + 2δHS)
−
√
2ψ [8ψ (1 + 2δHS)− 3λ2] [4ψ (1 + 2δHS) (1 + 3δPP )− λ2 (1− 4δHS + 9δPP )]











hold for the appropriate parameter space. Specifically, for (2.33), a higher δHS will
disadvantage HS in cost and thus make the region in which HS is more profitable smaller,
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that is, t̃πHS∼PP moves downwards. However, for (2.34), a higher δPP will disadvantage
PP in cost, or equivalently advantage HS in cost. Thus, the region in which HS is more
profitable will become larger, that is, t̃πHS∼PP moves upwards. Then, the change of t̃
π
HS∼PP
depends crucially on the comparison of the effects of δHS and δPP . In fact, under the
general framework of (2.30), (2.31) and (2.32), when (δHS, δPP ) changes from (0, 0) to
(1, 1), the effect of δHS on t̃
π
HS∼PP dominates that of δPP , that is, the indifference curve
moves downwards. To gain a more concrete understanding of these partial derivatives,
we look at a numerical example.




and changing δHS and δPP from 0 through 1, as shown
in Figure 2.12, given δPP , we can observe that
t̃πHS∼PP
v
decreases with δHS, and given δHS,
we can observe that
t̃πHS∼PP
v








(δHS ,δPP )=(1,1), (2.35)
when (δHS, δPP ) changes from (0, 0) to (1, 1), the indifference curve moves downwards.










































respectively. Changing from (2.37) to (2.36), the effect of flight frequency on the total
cost is amplified. Consequently, compared to Lin (2012), f 3∗MX and q
31∗
MX in this model are
lower.13 Then, because the flight frequency between the city pair of market AB under
MX increases with the extra travel time disutility t, f 3∗MX in this model will first become
zero if t decreases. Analogously, because the connecting traffic in market AB under MX
decreases with the extra travel time disutility t, q31∗MX in this model will first become zero
if t increases. Therefore, the bounds of MX in this model are tighter.
To summarize, as shown in Figure 2.13, given the tighter bounds of MX and the lower
indifference curve of HS and PP in this model, PP could be the airline’s optimal network
structure even when the extra travel time disutility is relatively low. In fact, the key
insight from Proposition 2.5 is that including the omitted negative network externality






Upper Bound of MX
Lower Bound of MX





Figure 2.13: Moves of Curve and Bounds after Introducing Congestion Delays
13Compared to Lin (2012), f3∗MX in this model is in fact higher when ψ <
7λ2
12 , which, however, does
not affect the result.
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2.3.2.4 Comparison Between HS (PP, MX) and 2H
Next, I incorporate 2H into the analysis. As before, I first compare the important variables













Proposition 2.6. Table 2.5 (resp. Table 2.6, Table 2.7) summarizes the comparison of




iff t > t1HS∼2H
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Aircraft Size s1∗HS < s
1∗







Table 2.5: Comparison of Variables Between HS and 2H
PP vs 2H
Markets AK BK/AB








> f1∗PP > f
2∗
2H





















2H iff t > t
1
PP∼2H




























Table 2.6: Comparison of Variables Between PP and 2H
According to Proposition 2.6, generally speaking, compared to the three other network
structures, the passenger in market AK under 2H faces a relatively high flight frequency
and fare, while the airline under 2H faces a relatively high cost. This result comes mainly
from the fact that the airline gathers high traffic between the city pair of market AK
under 2H. Moreover, specific intuitions are the same as those from previous analysis.






2H gives Proposition 2.7.
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MX vs 2H
Markets AK BK AB























































































iff t > t2MX∼2H







Table 2.7: Comparison of Variables Between MX and 2H
Proposition 2.7. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), for the airline:








































3. MX is always less profitable than 2H.
Proof. In Section 2.8.2.4.
Figures of Proposition 2.7 are in Section 2.8.2.4. First of all, without considering the
airline’s fixed investments of developing a hub airport, 2H dominates the three other net-








. This result essentially
arises from the exploitation of horizontal product differentiation to a larger extent in 2H.
That is, compared to HS, PP and MX, 2H allows passengers in more markets to choose
between imperfectly substitutable non-stop and one-stop services. Moreover, HS and PP
will be more profitable than 2H when the latter is infeasible. However, MX can never be
more profitable than 2H, as tMX > t2H and tMX = t2H .
To explain tMX > t2H , first, we know that tMX and t2H come from f
3∗
MX = 0 and
f i∗2H = 0 (i ∈ {2, 3}), respectively. Then, because f 3∗MX only carries local traffic between
A and B but f i∗2H carries both the local traffic in market i and the connecting traffic in
market j (i ∈ {2, 3} , j ∈ {2, 3} \ {i}), f 3∗MX will naturally be lower than f i∗2H .
Moreover, we can show that both f 3∗MX and f
i∗
2H increase with the extra travel time
disutility t. Intuitively, under MX, the higher extra travel time disutility can make the
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airline allocate more traffic to non-stop services in market AB, and thus, a higher marginal
benefit of f 3∗MX will motivate the airline to increase f
3∗
MX . However, for f
i∗
2H , because the




2H , there are two opposite
effects if the extra travel time disutility becomes higher. On the one hand, the higher
extra travel time disutility can make the airline allocate more traffic to non-stop services
in markets i and j. Then, a higher marginal benefit of f i∗2H will motivate the airline to
increase f i∗2H . On the other hand, the higher extra travel time disutility can also make the
airline allocate less traffic to one-stop services in markets i and j. Then, a lower marginal
benefit of f i∗2H will motivate the airline to decrease f
i∗
2H . Furthermore, as only f
i∗
2H carries
qi02H , the whole q
i0
2H affects the marginal benefit of f
i∗







2H together, only half of q
j1
2H affects the marginal benefit of f
i∗
2H . Then, the first effect
dominates the second, and thus f i∗2H also increases with the extra travel time disutility.
To summarize, as f 3∗MX is lower than f
i∗




2H increase with the
extra travel time disutility t, compared to f i∗2H , f
3∗
MX will first become zero if t decreases.
We can then obtain tMX > t2H .
Furthermore, in order to obtain that MX can never be more profitable than 2H, we
must also have tMX 6 t2H . In fact, we can show it by contradiction. Suppose there exists

































, which contradicts the fact
that the airline’s optimal profit under MX is always lower than that under 2H when both
MX and 2H are feasible. Then, we can obtain that tMX 6 t2H holds for any ψ.
2.3.2.5 The Airline’s Optimal Network Structure (HS, PP, MX, and 2H)




MX , and π
∗
2H with each other and provide the airline’s optimal
network structure from amongst HS, PP, MX, and 2H in Proposition 2.8.
Proposition 2.8. Considering HS, PP, MX, and 2H, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the airline’s
optimal network structure is:
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Proof. In Section 2.8.2.5.
Proposition 2.8 is shown in Figure 2.14. First of all, PP could still be the airline’s
optimal network structure when the extra travel time disutility is relatively low, even
though the region that PP is optimal for the airline shrinks due to the domination of
2H. Moreover, the result in Proposition 2.8 that 2H dominates the three other network
structures when it is feasible can also help us understand the multi-hubbing and de-
hubbing phenomena in the airline industry. In reality, we can observe that some airlines
develop new hubs and then use 2H (multi-hubbing), while some others change from 2H
to a single hub network (de-hubbing). Here comes a question: what is the motivation
for airlines to use 2H? One answer is that when an airline’s hub airport is congested, the
airline can develop another hub to reduce the congestion of the previous hub. However,
this answer might not be strong enough because besides 2H, PP and MX can also reduce
hub airport congestion. The result in Proposition 2.8 shows the role of horizontal product
differentiation and thus provides another explanation for the use of 2H. Other intuitions
from Proposition 2.8 are the same as those from Proposition 2.5.













Figure 2.14: The Airline’s Optimal Network Structure (HS, PP, MX, and 2H)
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2.4 Welfare Analysis
In this section, I assume that a social planner maximizes social welfare. In the second-
best socially optimal network structure analysis, the social planner chooses only a network
structure, while the airline chooses flight frequencies and traffic. However, in the first-best
socially optimal network structure analysis, the social planner decides all. The parameter
















. Therefore, considering both the first-best and second-best socially
optimal network structures will make the conclusion more robust. All critical values of
this section are in Table 2.17 in Section 2.10.
2.4.1 Second-Best Socially Optimal Network Structure
I define social welfare as the sum of airline profit and passenger surplus, in which the





























































According to (2.38) through (2.41), the network structure with higher traffic will make
itself more socially desirable.




MX , and sw
∗
2H with each other and provide the
second-best socially optimal network structure from amongst HS, PP, MX, and 2H in
Lemma 2.1.
Lemma 2.1. Considering HS, PP, MX, and 2H, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the second-best
socially optimal network structure is:
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Proof. In Section 2.9.1.1.
A general observation from Lemma 2.1 tells us that MX can be socially desirable when
the marginal congestion delay cost ψ is low, which is different from the fact that MX can
never be the airline’s optimal network structure as long as 2H is under consideration.
Next, I compare Proposition 2.8 and Lemma 2.1 to find the difference between the
second-best socially optimal network structure and the airline’s optimal network structure
(HS, PP, MX, and 2H). Proposition 2.9 summarizes this comparison.
Proposition 2.9. Considering HS, PP, MX, and 2H, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞):
1. The second-best socially optimal network structure is HS, while the airline’s optimal













2. The second-best socially optimal network structure is MX, while the airline’s opti-













Proof. In Section 2.9.1.2.
Proposition 2.9 is shown in Figure 2.15. Obviously, the inclusion of passenger surplus
does not help HS and PP to erode 2H.
For the first point in Proposition 2.9, according to the comparison of variables in
Proposition 2.1, the traffic in all markets under HS is higher than PP if the extra travel
time disutility t is low. Thus, given the higher traffic under HS, the social planner will
favor HS more than the airline.
For the second point, among all flight frequencies of MX and 2H, f i∗MX (i ∈ {1, 2}) is
relatively high and carries all traffic in market AK (BK) and the connecting traffic in
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Figure 2.15: Second-Best Socially Optimal Network Structure vs The Airline’s Optimal
Network Structure (HS, PP, MX, and 2H)
market AB. When the marginal congestion delay cost ψ is low, the airline is motivated
to set a high f i∗MX , which in fact provides relevant passengers with a significant schedule
delay reduction and thus is conducive to achieving the high traffic of MX. Besides, if the
extra travel time disutility t is close to tMX , f
3∗
MX will tend to zero and then MX is almost
de facto HS. According to Propositions 2.1, 2.3 and 2.6, HS has relatively high traffic
among all network structures. This fact thus explains why the traffic of MX is higher
only if t is relatively low, given a low ψ. Then, given the higher traffic under MX in some
region, the social planner will favor MX more than the airline. To have a more concrete
understanding, we look at a numerical example.
Example 2.2. Setting v = 1, in Figure 2.16, we find that the passenger surplus of MX
is higher than 2H only when both ψ
λ2
and t are low.
2.4.2 First-Best Socially Optimal Network Structure
I define social welfare as the difference between passenger utility and the cost of operating
flights. In fact, the social welfare function that the social planner maximizes under HS,
CHAPTER 2. AIRLINE NETWORKS 91















Figure 2.16: Passenger Surplus Difference Between MX and 2H (v = 1)
PP, MX, and 2H is equivalent to:































































respectively. Compared to the airline, as in (2.42) through (2.45), the social planner takes
the passenger surplus into account when making the decision.
Moreover, the parameter space is ψ ∈ (Ψsoc2H ,+∞) for comparing HS, PP, MX, and 2H




we compare the first-best socially optimal and the airline’s optimal network structures
(HS, PP, MX, and 2H), the parameter space is also ψ ∈ (Ψsoc2H ,+∞).
Except that the non-arbitrage condition does not exist any more, the process of solving
(2.42) through (2.45) is similar to that of solving (2.16), (2.19), (2.20), and (2.24). These
solutions are provided in Section 2.9.2. In the first-best socially optimal network structure
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THS =
6ψv




, in which TMX =
(2ψ+3λ2)v
10ψ−λ2 and TMX =
4ψv


















. For the following lemma and
propositions, I also omit proofs, which do not provide further information compared to
previous ones.14
First, I provide the first-best socially optimal network structure from amongst HS,
PP, MX, and 2H in Lemma 2.2.
Lemma 2.2. Considering HS, PP, MX, and 2H, under ψ ∈ (Ψsoc2H ,+∞), the first-best
socially optimal network structure is:




, PP if t ∈
(


















































In fact, because the difference between the airline’s and the social planner’s objective
function is only the passenger surplus, we can obtain the first-best socially optimal net-
work structure simply by shifting the airline’s optimal network structure horizontally to
the right.
Next, I compare Proposition 2.8 and Lemma 2.2 to find the difference between the
first-best socially optimal network structure and the airline’s optimal network structure
(HS, PP, MX, and 2H). Proposition 2.10 summarizes this comparison.
Proposition 2.10. Considering HS, PP, MX, and 2H, under ψ ∈ (Ψsoc2H ,+∞):
1. The first-best socially optimal network structure is HS, while the airline’s op-








T SWHS∼PP , T2H
}]







2. The first-best socially optimal network structure is PP, while the airline’s optimal
network structure is 2H, if t ∈
(
T SWHS∼PP , T2H
]







14All omitted proofs are available upon request.
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3. The first-best socially optimal network structure is 2H, while the airline’s optimal




, when ψ ∈ (Ψsoc2H ,+∞).
Proposition 2.10 is shown in Figure 2.17. According to Proposition 2.10, the airline’s
optimal network structure exhibits an inefficient bias towards 2H if the extra travel time
disutility t is relatively low and PP if t is relatively high.
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Figure 2.17: First-Best Socially Optimal Network Structure vs The Airline’s Optimal
Network Structure (HS, PP, MX, and 2H)
Finally, according to the analysis of both first-best and second-best socially optimal
network structures, we can obtain Proposition 2.11.
Proposition 2.11. From the social welfare point of view, there exist inefficient biases
towards PP and 2H in the airline’s optimal network structure.
2.5 Extension: 3-Hub Network
For completeness, I extend this work to incorporate a 3-hub network (3H), or an all-
hub network. This type of network structure does not exist in reality. One reason may
be due to the airline’s substantial fixed investments of developing all airports as hubs.
However, the analysis for such network structure can help us better understand the role
of horizontal product differentiation.
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Under 3H (Figure 2.18), all airports are hubs. Then, under 3H, the passenger in each
market can choose not only non-stop but also one-stop services, with the marginal utility
of local traffic αi0 = v+λf
i








− t, in which





















Figure 2.18: 3-Hub Network
The inverse demand functions will then be:
pi03H = v + λf
i












qi03H − qi13H . (2.47)




3H , and q
i1
3H (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}) are the fares and traffic of local
and connecting traffic in each market.
Moreover, the cost structure of 3H is the same as that of PP.


















































3H (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}), (2.48)




3H > 0 (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}).
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The second-order condition for solving (2.48) requires ψ ∈ (ψsoc3H ,+∞), in which ψsoc3H =
7λ2
12
. The solution is found in Section 2.10.
In addition, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc3H ,+∞), the constraint of extra travel time disutility t to








= tMX = t2H
)
, coming
from qi1∗3H > 0 (i ∈ {1, 2, 3}). For t < t3H , if the extra travel time disutility is too high, the
passenger in each market cannot obtain positive utility from choosing one-stop services,
and thus the airline has no interest in providing the service, implying qi1∗3H → 0.






2H , and π
∗
3H with each other and provide the airline’s
optimal network structure from amongst HS, PP, MX, 2H, and 3H in Proposition 2.12.
The parameter space is ψ ∈ (ψsoc3H ,+∞) for this comparison.
Proposition 2.12. Considering HS, PP, MX, 2H, and 3H, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc3H ,+∞), the









Proposition 2.12 is shown in Figure 2.19 and tells us that, without considering the
airline’s fixed investments of developing a hub airport, 3H is optimal for the airline as
long as the extra travel time disutility t is not too high. In fact, this result comes from
the presence of horizontal product differentiation in each market under 3H. Therefore,
Proposition 2.12 further shows the role of horizontal product differentiation in improving
passenger utility and airline profit.











Figure 2.19: The Airline’s Optimal Network Structure (HS, PP, MX, 2H, and 3H)
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2.6 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how congestion delays and horizontal product differentiation
shape airline network structures. The novelty of this work includes the complete coverage
of network structures, an increased understanding of the role of congestion delays in airline
network choice, and a new perspective of studying the 2-hub network (2H), that is, the
horizontal product differentiation.
The key results regarding the profitability of different network structures show the
impact of omitting negative network externality and the important role of horizontal
product differentiation in improving passenger utility and airline profit. Moreover, com-
parative statics show that the division of local and connecting traffic in one market can
provide airlines with some level of flexibility in the decision-making process.
In addition, welfare analysis also delivers a policy implication. When an airline pro-
poses merging with another in order to form a 2H, the antitrust authority should scrutinize
the case for the following reasons. First, when the network structure changes to 2H, fares
in many markets may increase but the social welfare may not. Second, with the sharp
decrease of oil price and the improvement of air traffic management systems, both the
marginal congestion delay cost and extra travel time disutility may decrease, and thus
the claimed efficiency of 2H could be in doubt.
Next, some caveats should be noted. One important assumption in this chapter is the
symmetry of demand among different markets. If the demand from a spoke airport to
hub airport is too limited, the airline’s benefit of horizontal product differentiation from
multiple hubs may be too weak compared to its fixed investments of developing a hub
airport. In this case, the network structures with fewer hubs will be favored more by the
airline. Moreover, according to the results of this chapter, one may try to hypothesize
that for some region, the more hubs there are, the higher the airline’s profit will be.
However, this hypothesis holds only when the airline’s fixed investments of developing
a hub airport are low enough. Furthermore, even though the focus of this chapter is
congestion delays and horizontal product differentiation, this does not mean that they are
the most important factors in airline network choice. Essentially, this chapter abstracts
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from other factors, for instance, the economies of traffic density and demand uncertainty,
and identifies how congestion delays and horizontal product differentiation themselves
affect airline network choice.
Finally, a direction of future research is to introduce airline competition, in which air-
lines can compete in one or more markets. Moreover, extending the analysis to arbitrary
number of cities in a network is also valuable.
2.7 Appendix A: Examples of Network Structures and
Schedules
First, an example of the hub-and-spoke network (HS) is the Alitalia network shown in
Figure 2.20. In this network, passengers traveling between Naples (Venice) and Rome
can take Alitalia flights to arrive directly, while passengers traveling between Naples and





Figure 2.20: An Example of Hub-and-Spoke Network (Alitalia)
Second, an example of the point-to-point network (PP) is the Ryanair network shown
in Figure 2.21. In this network, passengers traveling between any two airports from
amongst Edinburgh, Brussels-CRL and Bordeaux can take Ryanair flights to arrive di-
rectly.
Third, an example of the mixed network (MX) is the Air France network shown in
Figure 2.22. In this network, passengers traveling between Bordeaux (Nice) and Paris-






Figure 2.21: An Example of Point-to-Point Network (Ryanair)
Orly can take Air France flights to arrive directly. However, for passengers traveling
between Bordeaux and Nice, they can take either HOP! flights to arrive directly or Air







Figure 2.22: An Example of Mixed Network (Air France)
Finally, as shown in Tables 2.8 through 2.11, flight schedules between Toulouse and
Frankfurt (Munich) indicate different flight departure time slots.
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No. Departure Arrival Connection Airport
Operated by
First Part Second Part
1 07:05 09:00 Lufthansa
2 12:45 14:35 Lufthansa
3 18:55 20:45 Lufthansa
4 06:05 09:40 Munich Lufthansa Cityline Lufthansa
5 06:05 10:10 Munich Lufthansa Cityline Lufthansa
6 08:35 12:10 Munich Lufthansa Cityline Lufthansa
7 08:35 13:05 Munich Lufthansa Cityline Lufthansa
8 13:00 17:05 Munich Lufthansa Cityline Lufthansa
Table 2.8: From Toulouse to Frankfurt on November 1, 2016
Source: Lufthansa’s reservation website
No. Departure Arrival Connection Airport
Operated by
First Part Second Part
1 10:10 11:50 Lufthansa
2 16:35 18:15 Lufthansa
3 21:00 22:40 Lufthansa
4 07:15 12:25 Munich Lufthansa Lufthansa Cityline
5 08:15 12:25 Munich Lufthansa Lufthansa Cityline
6 13:15 17:35 Munich Lufthansa Air Dolomiti
7 16:15 21:00 Munich Lufthansa Lufthansa Cityline
8 17:15 21:00 Munich Lufthansa Lufthansa Cityline
Table 2.9: From Frankfurt to Toulouse on November 10, 2016
Source: Lufthansa’s reservation website
2.8 Appendix B: Derivations and Proofs of Market Out-
come
2.8.1 Derivations and Proofs of Flight Frequencies and Traffic
2.8.1.1 Hub-and-Spoke Network
I first do not put the non-arbitrage condition as a constraint of the maximization problem.
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No. Departure Arrival Connection Airport
Operated by
First Part Second Part
1 06:05 07:50 Lufthansa Cityline
2 08:35 10:20 Lufthansa Cityline
3 13:00 14:45 Lufthansa Cityline
4 18:50 20:35 Air Dolomiti
5 07:05 11:15 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
6 07:05 13:15 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
7 12:45 17:15 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
8 12:45 18:15 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
Table 2.10: From Toulouse to Munich on November 1, 2016
Source: Lufthansa’s reservation website
No. Departure Arrival Connection Airport
Operated by
First Part Second Part
1 06:10 08:00 Lufthansa Cityline
2 10:35 12:25 Lufthansa Cityline
3 15:45 17:35 Air Dolomiti
4 19:10 21:00 Lufthansa Cityline
5 08:00 11:50 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
6 14:00 18:15 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
7 18:00 22:40 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
8 19:00 22:40 Frankfurt Lufthansa Lufthansa
Table 2.11: From Munich to Toulouse on November 10, 2016
Source: Lufthansa’s reservation website
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∂q3HS










in which i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}.






> 0, contradicting ∂πHS
∂qi
HS
6 0. Then, we have f iHS > 0 because otherwise
qiHS > 0 cannot hold. Finally, we have q
3
HS > 0 because otherwise PP will dominate HS.
Thus, only the interior solution matters, implying:
f 1∗HS = f
2∗
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in which φHS = 8ψ − λ2.
Then, the exclusion of all corner solutions implies that the domain of πHS becomes
R
5
++, which is a convex open set. Moreover, when ψ ∈ (ψsocHS,+∞), the Hessian D2πHS is
negative definite for all ΩHS ∈ R5++, implying that πHS is a strictly concave function on
R
5
++. Consequently, the optimal solution is a unique global maximizer of πHS on R
5
++.
Proof of Non-Arbitrage Condition
Proof. The non-arbitrage condition is satisfied because of:
p1∗HS + p
2∗














The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
∂πPP
∂f iPP



















in which i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.






> 0, contradicting ∂πPP
∂qi
PP
6 0. Then, we have f iPP > 0 because otherwise
qiPP > 0 cannot hold. Thus, only the interior solution matters, implying:






in which i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and φPP = 16ψ − λ2.
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Then, following the reasoning in Section 2.8.1.1, the optimal solution under PP is a
































































in which i ∈ {1, 2}.






> 0, contradicting ∂πMX
∂qi
MX
6 0. (II) We have f iMX > 0 because otherwise
qiMX > 0 cannot hold. (III) Analogously, f
3
MX = 0 and q
30
MX > 0 also cannot hold
simultaneously. (IV) f 3MX > 0 and q
30
MX = 0 cannot hold simultaneously because it is
not optimal for the airline to operate empty flights. (V) If all variables except f 3MX and
q30MX (resp. q
31
MX) are positive, MX is de facto HS (resp. PP). (VI) If all variables except




MX are positive, PP will dominate MX. Thus, only the interior solution
matters, implying:




12ψ (v − t)− λ2 (3v − t)
]
φ−1MX ,
f 3∗MX = λ
[
4ψ (−v + 5t)− λ2 (3v + t)
]
φ−1MX ,



















8ψ (v − 2t) + λ2t
]
φ−1MX ,
in which φMX = 96ψ
2 − 52λ2ψ + 3λ4.
Then, following the reasoning in Section 2.8.1.1, the optimal solution under MX is a
unique global maximizer of πMX on R
7
++.
Proof of Non-Arbitrage Condition
Proof. The non-arbitrage condition is satisfied because of:
p1∗MX + p
2∗









in which the latter always holds, that is:
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∂π2H
∂q12H























in which i ∈ {2, 3} and j ∈ {2, 3} \ {i}.






> 0, contradicting ∂π2H
∂q1
2H
6 0. (II) We have f 12H > 0 because otherwise q
1
2H > 0
cannot hold. (III) Analogously, f i2H = 0 and q
i0
2H > 0 (q
j1
2H > 0) cannot hold simulta-
neously. (IV) According to (2.62), qi02H = 0 and q
i1
2H = 0 cannot hold simultaneously








f i2H > 0, q
i0
2H = 0 and q
j1
2H = 0 cannot hold simultaneously because it is not optimal for
the airline to operate empty flights. (VI) If there are f i2H > 0, q
i0
2H > 0, q
i1





2H = 0, and q
j1
2H > 0, 2H is de facto HS. (VII) If all variables except (resp. one of) q
21
2H
and q312H are positive, 2H is de facto PP (resp. MX). (VIII) Cases that all variables except
q202H or (and) q
30
2H are positive imply that, there are non-stop services between the origin
and destination airports, but the airline forbids passengers who wish to travel between
them to choose these non-stop services, which are empirically irrelevant. (IX) If there is
f 12H = f
2
2H = 0, PP will dominate 2H. Thus, only the interior solution matters, implying:
f 1∗2H = λ
[
12ψ (3v − 4t)− λ2 (5v − 4t)
]
φ−12H ,

























8ψ (v − 2t) + λ2t
]
φ−12H ,
in which φ2H = 192ψ
2 − 84λ2ψ + 5λ4.
Then, following the reasoning in Section 2.8.1.1, the optimal solution under 2H is a
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unique global maximizer of π2H on R
8
++.
Proof of Non-Arbitrage Condition
Proof. The non-arbitrage conditions (i ∈ {2, 3} , j ∈ {2, 3} \ {i}) are satisfied because of:
p1∗2H + p
i0∗













in which the latter always holds.
2.8.2 Proofs of Network Structure
2.8.2.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsocHS,+∞), the sign of π∗HS − π∗PP depends on a quadratic function
of t. As the coefficient of t2 is positive, the parabola opens upwards. Moreover, the
discriminant:




Then, solving π∗HS − π∗PP = 0 gives two roots, in which the smaller root is less than

















Therefore, for the airline, π∗HS is higher and then HS is more profitable if t ∈ (0, tπHS∼PP ];




. Moreover, π∗HS does





2.8.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsocMX ,+∞), the sign of π∗HS − π∗MX depends on a quadratic function
of t. As the coefficient of t2 is negative, the parabola opens downwards. Moreover, the
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discriminant:
∆ = −192λ2ψ2v2φHSφMX ,
is negative. To summarize, the quadratic function of t is always negative. We can
also verify tMX < tHS. Therefore, for the airline, π
∗
MX is higher and then MX is more











. This result is shown in Figure 2.23.












Figure 2.23: Comparison of Profits Between HS and MX
In addition, under ψ ∈ (ψsocMX ,+∞), π∗PP −π∗MX is negative. Therefore, for the airline,




. Moreover, π∗MX does






. This result is
shown in Figure 2.24.
2.8.2.3 Proof of Proposition 2.5
Proof. The comparison between tπHS∼PP and tMX is the key to the proof.







. Then, we have:
tπHS∼PP − tMX =
σ1 (x) v
(−x+ 20) (−x+ 16) (−x+ 12) ,
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Figure 2.24: Comparison of Profits Between PP and MX
in which (−x+ 20) (−x+ 16) (−x+ 12) > 0 and:
σ1 (x) = −3x3 + 92x2 − 896x+ 3072− 6 (−x+ 20) (−x+ 8)
√
−x+ 16.
By considering the gradients and extrema of d
nσ1(x)
dxn




Then, starting from d
4σ1(x)
dx4

































σ1 (x) < 0. (2.65)
According to (2.65), we can obtain σ1 (x) < 0. Therefore, we have t
π
HS∼PP < tMX .
Then, the order of relevant critical values is 0 < tπHS∼PP < tMX < tMX < tHS.
Combining the results in Propositions 2.2 and 2.4, we can obtain Proposition 2.5.
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2.8.2.4 Proof of Proposition 2.7
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the sign of π∗HS − π∗2H depends on a quadratic function of







. Then, the coefficient of t2 becomes σ2 (x)ψ
3,
in which σ2 (x) is a polynomial of degree 3 and is negative. Thus, the parabola opens
downwards. Meanwhile, the discriminant:
∆ = −48ψv2
(
288ψ2 − 140λ2ψ + 21λ4
)
φHSφ2H ,
is negative. To summarize, the quadratic function of t is always negative. Moreover,
because of t2H = tMX and tMX < tHS, we have t2H < tHS. Therefore, for the airline, π
∗
2H








. Moreover, π∗2H does






















. This result is shown in Figure 2.25.












Figure 2.25: Comparison of Profits Between HS and 2H
In addition, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), we have π∗PP −π∗2H < 0. Therefore, for the airline,
































. This result is shown in Figure
2.26.
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Figure 2.26: Comparison of Profits Between PP and 2H
Besides, under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), we have π∗MX−π∗2H < 0. We can then verify tMX > t2H
and tMX = t2H . Therefore, for the airline, MX is always less profitable than 2H.
2.8.2.5 Proof of Proposition 2.8
Proof. The comparison between tπHS∼PP and t2H is the key to the proof.









. Then, we have:
tπHS∼PP − t2H =
σ3 (x) v
16 (−x+ 16) (−x+ 12) ,
in which (−x+ 16) (−x+ 12) > 0 and:
σ3 (x) = −5x3 + 144x2 − 1264x+ 3840− 96 (−x+ 8)
√
−x+ 16.
By considering the gradients and extrema of d
nσ3(x)
dxn




Then, starting from d
4σ3(x)
dx4





















)σ3 (x) < 0. (2.66)
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0. Moreover, because σ3 (x) strictly decreases in x, x
′
is unique. Meanwhile, we have





















































































. Then, the order of relevant critical values is in Table 2.12. Combining
the results in Propositions 2.2 and 2.7, we can obtain Proposition 2.8.













0 < t2H 6 t
π





0 < tπHS∼PP < t2H < tHS
Table 2.12: Order of Critical Values (Proposition 2.8)
2.9 Appendix C: Proofs and Solutions of Welfare Anal-
ysis
2.9.1 Proofs of Second-Best Socially Optimal Network Structure
2.9.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
(I) Comparison Between sw∗HS and sw
∗
PP
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Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the sign of sw∗HS−sw∗PP depends on a quadratic function of
t. As the coefficient of t2 is positive, the parabola opens upwards. Meanwhile, let λ2 = xψ,







. Then, for the discriminant, we have sign (∆) = sign (σ4 (x)), in
which σ4 (x) is a polynomial of degree 3 and is positive. Thus, the discriminant is positive.
Then, solving sw∗HS− sw∗PP = 0 gives two roots, in which the smaller root is less than





, only the smaller root is relevant, denoted by:
tswHS∼PP =
6v













Therefore, sw∗HS is higher and then HS is more socially desirable if t ∈ (0, tswHS∼PP ];










(II) Comparison Between sw∗HS and sw
∗
MX
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the sign of sw∗HS− sw∗MX depends on a quadratic function







. Then, the coefficient of t2 becomes 2σ5 (x)ψ
6,
in which σ5 (x) is a polynomial of degree 5 and is negative. Thus, the parabola opens
downwards. Meanwhile, for the discriminant, we have sign (∆) = sign (σ6 (x)), in which
σ6 (x) is a polynomial of degree 3 and is negative. Then, the discriminant is negative.
To summarize, the quadratic function of t is always negative. Therefore, sw∗MX is




. Moreover, sw∗MX does







(III) Comparison Between sw∗HS and sw
∗
2H
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the sign of sw∗HS − sw∗2H depends on a quadratic function







. Then, the coefficient of t2 becomes σ7 (x)ψ
6,
in which σ7 (x) is a polynomial of degree 6. By considering the gradients and extrema of
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dnσ7(x)
dxn
, we can find the gradients of d
n−1σ7(x)
dxn−1














)σ7 (x) < 0. (2.67)
According to (2.67), we can obtain σ7 (x) < 0. Thus, the parabola opens downwards.
Meanwhile, for the discriminant, we have sign (∆) = sign (σ8 (x)), in which σ8 (x) is a
polynomial of degree 5. By considering the gradients and extrema of d
nσ8(x)
dxn
, we can find
the gradients of d
n−1σ8(x)
dxn−1
. Then, starting from d
4σ8(x)
dx4











)σ8 (x) < 0. (2.68)
According to (2.68), we can obtain σ8 (x) < 0. Then, the discriminant is negative.
To summarize, the quadratic function of t is always negative. Therefore, sw∗2H is

































(IV) Comparison Between sw∗PP and sw
∗
MX
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the sign of sw∗PP − sw∗MX depends on a quadratic function







. Then, the coefficient of t2 becomes σ9 (x)ψ
6,
in which σ9 (x) is a polynomial of degree 6. By considering the gradients and extrema of
dnσ9(x)
dxn
, we can find the gradients of d
n−1σ9(x)
dxn−1














)σ9 (x) < 0. (2.69)
According to (2.69), we can obtain σ9 (x) < 0. Thus, the parabola opens downwards.











Then, solving sw∗PP − sw∗MX = 0 gives two roots, in which the smaller root equals
tMX . Therefore, sw
∗












(V) Comparison Between sw∗PP and sw
∗
2H
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the sign of sw∗PP − sw∗2H depends on a quadratic function







. Then, the coefficient of t2 becomes σ10 (x)ψ
6,
in which σ10 (x) is a polynomial of degree 6. By considering the gradients and extrema of
dnσ10(x)
dxn
, we can find the gradients of d
n−1σ10(x)
dxn−1














)σ10 (x) < 0. (2.70)











Then, solving sw∗PP − sw∗2H = 0 gives two roots, in which the smaller root equals t2H .
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(VI) Comparison Between sw∗MX and sw
∗
2H
Proof. Under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞), the sign of sw∗MX − sw∗2H depends on a quadratic function







. Then, the coefficient of t2 becomes σ11 (x)ψ
8,
in which σ11 (x) is a polynomial of degree 8. By considering the gradients and extrema of
dnσ11(x)
dxn
, we can find the gradients of d
n−1σ11(x)
dxn−1





















)σ11 (x) < 0. (2.71)






























Moreover, because σ11 (x) strictly increases in x, x
′′
is unique. Meanwhile, we have

































= µ1 (≈ 1.47).
Thus, we can obtain σ11 (x) > 0 (resp. σ11 (x) < 0) and then the parabola opens













can obtain σ11 (x) = 0 and then the sign of sw
∗
MX − sw∗2H depends on a linear function




When ψ = λ
2
µ1





. Therefore, sw∗MX is lower than sw
∗





























is positive. Then, solving sw∗MX−sw∗2H = 0 gives two roots, in which the first root equals
t2H . However, we cannot determine the value of the second root.






, that is, the parabola opens upwards. Let λ2 = xψ,
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. By comparing the second root with 0, tMX and t2H , we have
that the second root is non-positive when x ∈ (µ1, µ2]; positive but not greater than tMX








µ2 (≈ 1.48) is a unique real root of:








; and ξ2 (≈ 1.51) is a unique real root of:









Therefore, sw∗MX is higher (resp. lower) than sw
∗

















and sw∗MX is lower than sw
∗
























6 − 4681728λ2ψ5 + 3071232λ4ψ4
− 939264λ6ψ3 + 133664λ8ψ2 − 7168λ10ψ + 105λ12,
ζ3 = 42467328ψ
7 − 79331328λ2ψ6 + 57028608λ4ψ5 − 20322048λ6ψ4
+ 3813632λ8ψ3 − 366688λ10ψ2 + 17216λ12ψ − 315λ14.






, that is, the parabola opens downwards. Let λ2 = xψ,
in which x ∈ (0, µ1). By comparing the second root with t2H , we have that the second
root is always greater than tMX . Therefore, sw
∗
MX is lower than sw
∗











To summarize, first, sw∗MX is higher (resp. lower) and then MX (resp. 2H) is more




























; and third, sw∗MX does not exist and then 2H is more socially desirable if









under ψ ∈ (ψsoc2H ,+∞).
(VII) Order of Critical Values
Proof. The comparison between tswHS∼PP and tMX (t2H) is the key to the proof.







. Then, we have:
tswHS∼PP − tMX =
σ12 (x) v
(−x+ 20) (−x+ 16) (3x2 − 56x+ 288) ,
in which (−x+ 20) (−x+ 16) (3x2 − 56x+ 288) > 0 and:
σ12 (x) = 9x
4 − 324x3 + 4288x2 − 27136x+ 73728
− 6 (−x+ 20) (−x+ 8)
√
2 (−3x3 + 124x2 − 1344x+ 4608).
By considering the gradients and extrema of d
nσ12(x)
dxn
, we can find the gradients of
dn−1σ12(x)
dxn−1
. Then, starting from d
5σ12(x)
dx5





= sign (σ13 (x)), in which




we can find the gradients of d
n−1σ13(x)
dxn−1
. Then, starting from d
11σ13(x)
dx11
and inferring step by

















)σ13 (x) < 0. (2.72)






























Moreover, because σ13 (x) strictly increases in x, x
′′′
is unique. Meanwhile, we have

































= µ3 (≈ 0.98).
Then, we have d
5σ12(x)
dx5
6 0 when x ∈ (0, µ3] and d
5σ12(x)
dx5
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Consequently, because of d
4σ12(x)
dx4
> 0 when x
′′′
= µ3, we have
d4σ12(x)
dx4

















)σ12 (x) < 0. (2.73)
According to (2.73), we can obtain σ12 (x) < 0. Therefore, we have t
sw










. Then, we have:
tswHS∼PP − t2H =
σ14 (x) v
16 (−x+ 16) (3x2 − 56x+ 288) ,
in which (−x+ 16) (3x2 − 56x+ 288) > 0 and:
σ14 (x) = 15x
4 − 532x3 + 6720x2 − 38528x+ 92160
− 96 (−x+ 8)
√
2 (−3x3 + 124x2 − 1344x+ 4608).
By considering the gradients and extrema of d
nσ14(x)
dxn
, we can find the gradients of
dn−1σ14(x)
dxn−1
. Then, starting from d
5σ14(x)
dx5





= sign (σ15 (x)), in which




we can find the gradients of d
n−1σ15(x)
dxn−1
. Then, starting from d
10σ15(x)
dx10
and inferring step by












)σ15 (x) > 0. (2.74)


































)σ14 (x) < 0. (2.75)
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0. Moreover, because σ14 (x) strictly decreases in x, x
(4) is unique. Meanwhile, we have









































gives x(4) = ξ3 (≈ 1.59).
















Then, the order of relevant critical values is in Table 2.13. Combining the results in
Parts (I) through (VI), we can obtain Lemma 2.1.






0 < tswHS∼PP < t2H < tMX < t
sw








0 < t2H 6 t
sw
HS∼PP < tMX < t
sw








0 < t2H < t
sw





0 < tswHS∼PP < tMX < t2H < tHS
Table 2.13: Order of Critical Values (Lemma 2.1)
2.9.1.2 Proof of Proposition 9
Proof. The comparison between tswHS∼PP and t
π
HS∼PP is the key to the proof.







. Then, we have:
tswHS∼PP − tπHS∼PP =
6 (−x+ 8) σ16 (x) v
(−x+ 16) (−x+ 12) (3x2 − 56x+ 288) ,
in which −x+ 8 > 0, (−x+ 16) (−x+ 12) (3x2 − 56x+ 288) > 0 and:
σ16 (x) = ζ4 + ζ5 − ζ6,
ζ4 = 32x− 2x2 > 0,
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ζ5 =
(
3x2 − 56x+ 288
)√
−x+ 16 > 0,
ζ6 = (−x+ 12)
√
2 (−3x3 + 124x2 − 1344x+ 4608) > 0.
Moreover, we have:
ζ5 − ζ6 > 0
⇔ (ζ5)2 − (ζ6)2 = x (−x+ 8)
(
3x3 − 64x2 + 224x+ 1152
)
> 0. (2.76)





Then, the order of relevant critical values is in Table 2.14. Combining the results in
Proposition 2.8 and Lemma 2.1, we can obtain Proposition 2.9.






0 < tπHS∼PP < t
sw
HS∼PP < t2H < tMX < t
sw








0 < tπHS∼PP < t2H 6 t
sw
HS∼PP < tMX < t
sw







0 < tπHS∼PP < t2H < t
sw
















0 < tπHS∼PP < t
sw
HS∼PP < tMX < t2H < tHS
Table 2.14: Order of Critical Values (Proposition 2.9)
2.9.2 Solutions of First-Best Socially Optimal Network Structure
First, the solution of the hub-and-spoke network is:
F 1∗HS = F
2∗

















in which ΦHS = 4ψ − λ2.
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Second, the solution of the point-to-point network is:






in which i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and ΦPP = 8ψ − λ2.
Third, the solution of the mixed network is:




6ψ (v − t)− λ2 (3v − t)
]
Φ−1MX ,
F 3∗MX = λ
[



















4ψ (v − 2t) + λ2t
]
Φ−1MX ,
in which ΦMX = 24ψ
2 − 26λ2ψ + 3λ4.
Finally, the solution of the 2-hub network is:
F 1∗2H = λ
[
6ψ (3v − 4t)− λ2 (5v − 4t)
]
Φ−12H ,

























4ψ (v − 2t) + λ2t
]
Φ−12H ,
in which Φ2H = 48ψ
2 − 42λ2ψ + 5λ4.
CHAPTER 2. AIRLINE NETWORKS 121
2.10 Appendix D: Extension and Critical Values
The solution of the 3-hub network is:
f i∗3H = λ (2v − t) (2φ3H)−1,
qi0∗3H =
[












in which i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and φ3H = 12ψ − λ2.












































































Table 2.15: Critical Values of Comparative Statics























































































4 − 3840λ2ψ3 + 3072λ4ψ2 − 640λ6ψ + 51λ8
∆22MX∼2H = 99072ψ
4 − 97536λ2ψ3 + 29952λ4ψ2 − 2944λ6ψ + 97λ8


















ξ2 (≈ 1.51) is a solution of 63x5 − 2172x4 + 26192x3 − 131136x2 + 291840x− 221184 = 0
ξ3 (≈ 1.59) is a solution of 15x4 − 532x3 + 6720x2 − 38528x+ 92160
−96 (−x+ 8)
√











Table 2.17: Critical Values of Welfare Analysis
Chapter 3
Agricultural Land Marketization,
Inverse Relationship and Land
Productivity: Empirical Evidence from
China
3.1 Introduction
For developing countries, especially those in transition from agricultural to non-agricultural
economy, on the one hand, the transition of economy reduces the amount of agricultural
labor significantly and thus decreases the utilization rate of agricultural land. On the
other hand, the transition increases the demand of agricultural products of urban areas
and thus further aggravates the balance between supply and demand. Given the reality
that the domestic farmland cannot be enlarged easily, governments in many countries try
to improve the output per unit of land, or land productivity, to increase the supply of
agricultural products.
According to economic theory, the agricultural land marketization can improve the
land allocation efficiency. After the agricultural land marketization, less efficient agri-
cultural producers can rent out or sell some of their land at a price higher than their
123
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marginal production, while more efficient producers can rent in or buy some land at a
price lower than their marginal production. Finally, the agricultural land will be allocated
more efficiently through market mechanism (see Yao, 2000; Benjamin and Brandt, 2002;
Carter and Yao, 2002; Deininger and Jin, 2005, 2008; Deininger et al., 2008a; Deininger
et al., 2008b; Jin and Deininger, 2009; Barrett et al., 2010). Then, if the agricultural
land marketization can improve the land allocation efficiency, can it also improve the
average output per unit of land, or average land productivity? The conventional answer
is affirmative because the higher land allocation efficiency implies the higher average land
productivity (see, for example, Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis, 20171). However, if we
consider the inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity, the answer is
uncertain.
In many developing countries, there exists an inverse relationship between farm size
and land productivity.2 That is, compared to rural households with a large farm size,
those with a small farm size have higher land productivity. This relationship has been
found in the countries of Asia (see Sen, 1962; Lau and Yotopoulos, 1971; Bardhan, 1973;
Rao and Chotigeat, 1981; Carter, 1984; Newell et al., 1997; Heltberg, 1998; Lamb, 2003),
Africa (see Collier, 1983; Barrett, 1996; Byiringiro and Reardon, 1996; Kimhi, 2006;
Carletto et al., 2013; Larson et al., 2014; Ali and Deininger, 2015), Europe (see Chayanov,
1926; Alvarez and Arias, 2004), and Latin America (see Berry and Cline, 1979; Cornia,
1985).3
After the agricultural land marketization, on the one hand, the previously unused
land can be used again, and thus the total operational farm size may increase. Given
the amount of rural households, the average operational farm size may also increase. On
1Restuccia and Santaeulalia-Llopis (2017) use household-level data from Malawi and find that a real-
location of production factors to their efficient use will result in higher average total factor productivity
(TFP) of farmers, in which the farm TFP and the output per unit of land are found to be strongly
positively correlated across farms because the allocation of land is not related to productivity so many
productive farmers are constrained by size.
2The reasons explaining the existence of inverse relationship include, among others, land market
imperfections (see Heltberg, 1998; Lamb, 2003), labor market imperfections (see Sen, 1966; Rosenzweig
and Wolpin, 1985; Frisvold, 1994), credit market imperfections (see Feder, 1985; Eswaran and Kotwal,
1986; Carter, 1988), and risk (see Wiens, 1977; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Kevane, 1996).
3Some studies show that, in USA and Japan, farm size is positively correlated with land productivity
(see Sumner, 2014; Kawasaki, 2010).
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the other hand, rural households can obtain monetary incomes from land transactions,
which can provide a basic guarantee for their migrations to urban areas. In this way,
the amount of rural households may decrease, and the average operational farm size may
then increase. Under the inverse relationship, the increase of average operational farm
size will reduce the average land productivity.
To summarize, the agricultural land marketization affects the average land productiv-
ity not only through improving the land allocation efficiency but also through increasing
the average operational farm size.4 The improvement of land allocation efficiency has
a positive effect on average land productivity. However, when there exists an inverse
relationship between farm size and land productivity, the increase of average operational
farm size has a negative effect on average land productivity. Therefore, the agricultural
land marketization does not necessarily improve the average land productivity. Only
when the positive effect of the higher land allocation efficiency dominates the negative
effect of the larger average operational farm size, the marketization will finally improve
the average land productivity.
In this chapter, we use the year 2008 as the indicator of the agricultural land mar-
ketization in China to test empirically the effect of the marketization on average land
productivity. The empirical framework is the one for the study of inverse relationship
(see Binswanger et al., 1995; Assunção and Braido, 2007; Barrett et al., 2010; Carletto
et al., 2013) and the data we use is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS)
database5. Finally, we find that: first, there exists an inverse relationship between farm
size and land productivity in China; second, the agricultural land marketization in China
improves the land allocation efficiency and increases the average operational farm size;
third, the higher land allocation efficiency improves the average land productivity by
29.1% and the larger average operational farm size reduces the average land productivity
by 9.2%, implying that the agricultural land marketization in China finally improves the
4The agricultural land marketization affects the average land productivity also through, for example,
influencing indirectly the amount of labor input and intermediate inputs. However, in this chapter, we
focus our discussions on the direct effects of the marketization, that is, improving the land allocation
efficiency and increasing the average operational farm size.
5http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china
CHAPTER 3. AGRICULTURAL LAND MARKETIZATION 126
average land productivity by 19.9%.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the agricultural
land marketization in China and proposes four hypotheses to be tested in the empirical
analysis. Section 3.3 describes the empirical framework. Section 3.4 explains the data
and the relevant descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 shows empirical results. Section 3.6
concludes.
3.2 Agricultural Land Marketization in China
In the collective periods beginning in the 1950s, the Chinese government prohibited trans-
actions in land, labor and rental markets (see Lin, 1995). Since the rural reform in 1978,
a household-based farming system, that is, the household responsibility system, was ex-
ecuted, and thus the prohibition on the transactions in labor was abandoned. However,
the transactions in land were still prohibited. The Constitution of the People’s Republic
of China (1982) stipulates that no organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell
or lease land or otherwise engage in the transfer of land by unlawful means.6
With the rapid development of urbanization in the mid of 1980s, in order to satisfy
the demand of urban development, the Amendment to the Constitution of the People’s
Republic of China (1988) stipulates that the right to the use of land may be transferred
according to law and thus provides a legal basis for the transfer of land.7 However,
this amendment to the constitution emphasizes the transfer of industrial land and city
construction land and does not provide detailed legal explanations for the transfer of
agricultural land between rural households. In this period, more and more farmers move
to urban areas in order to pursue a higher quality of life and income, making some land
in rural areas unused (see Xu and Zhang, 1993; Wu, 1993; Ma, 2008).
In order to reduce the waste of agricultural resources and improve the utilization effi-
ciency of agricultural land, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Land Contract
in Rural Areas (2003) stipulates that the right to land contractual management obtained
6http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2830.htm
7http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/node_2829.htm
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through household contract may, according to law, be circulated by subcontracting, leas-
ing, exchanging, transferring or other means.8 For creating a better environment for the
transfer of agricultural land, the Measures for the Administration of Circulation of Rural
Land Contracted Management Right was carried out by the Ministry of Agriculture of
China in 2005.9 In 2008, the Decision of the Central Committee of the Communist Party
of China on Several Big Issues on Promoting the Reform and Development of Rural Areas
decided to strengthen the development of agricultural land transfer market and improve
the transfer rate.10
Based on the above reform process in China, we use the year 2008 as the indicator of
the agricultural land marketization. We first propose four hypotheses to be tested in the
empirical analysis.
Hypothesis 1: There exists an inverse relationship between farm size and land pro-
ductivity in China.
Hypothesis 2: The agricultural land marketization in China improves the land allo-
cation efficiency and thus the average land productivity.
Hypothesis 3: The agricultural land marketization in China increases the average
operational farm size; given the existence of the inverse relationship, the marketization
reduces the average land productivity.
Hypothesis 4: The positive effect of the higher land allocation efficiency dominates
the negative effect of the larger average operational farm size, and thus the agricultural
land marketization in China finally improves the average land productivity.
The relationship between these four hypotheses is shown in Figure 3.1. Because
the agricultural land market in China is imperfect, there is necessity to implement an
agricultural land marketization reform and discuss whether or not the marketization can
improve the average land productivity. Hypothesis 1 is another premise. Because of
the existence of inverse relationship, the effect of the agricultural land marketization on
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to test the effect. Hypothesis 4 is the net effect of these two channels and the central
problem of this chapter.







Average Operational Farm Size
Hypothesis 2: Higher
Land Allocation Efficiency
Hypothesis 4: Positive Effect of
Marketization on Average Land Productivity
Figure 3.1: Relationship Between Different Hypotheses
3.3 Empirical Framework







i exp εi, (3.1)
in which Yi is the output; T is the technological level; Ai is the operational farm size, that
is, the cropped area; Li is the labor input; Ri is the intermediate inputs; and εi is an error
term which accounts for unobserved and idiosyncratic determinants of the total output.
αA, αL and αR represent the output elasticities of operational farm size, labor input and
intermediate inputs, respectively. In order to be consistent with our data, we need to
represent the total output and the intermediate inputs in monetary units. Multiplying







i exp εi, (3.2)
in which yi = pY Y is the value of output, t =
pY T
(pR)
αR is the price-adjusted technological
level and ri = pRR is the value of intermediate inputs.
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Taking the natural logarithm of both sides of (3.2), we can obtain:
ln yi = ln t+ αA lnAi + αL lnLi + αR ln ri + εi, (3.3)




= ln t+ (αA − 1) lnAi + αL lnLi + αR ln ri + εi. (3.4)
Based on (3.4) and the framework for the study of inverse relationship (see Binswanger





= Cons+ β lnAi + γkCVki + εi, (3.5)
in which yi
Ai
is the output value per unit of land, that is, land productivity, of the house-
hold i; Cons is the constant, implying the price-adjusted technological level of agricultural
production; CVki are control variables, including other agricultural production factors,
household characteristics and land quality differences. The other agricultural production
factors include labor input (Labor) and intermediate inputs (Raising), both of which
have a positive effect on the land productivity. The household characteristics include the
household head’s age (Age), gender (Gend), education level (Edu), marriage situation
(Marriage), household size (Hsize), and dependency ratio (Dratio). An older house-
hold head implies richer agricultural production experience, which is conducive to higher
land productivity; a divorced, single or female household head may bring lower land pro-
ductivity; a household head with a higher education level implies richer knowledge of
agricultural production, which is conducive to improving land productivity by using high
and new technology; a household with a large size inclines to use internal labor, instead
of hiring external labor; and a household with a high dependency ratio needs to use more
labor input to feed dependants. Moreover, we introduce the village fixed effect to control
the land quality differences (see Bhalla and Roy, 1988; Benjamin, 1995).
We will run OLS regressions for the full sample and all subsamples. The coefficient
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of interest is β, representing the relationship between farm size and land productivity.
Then, we can use the following method to test Hypothesis 1.
Test of Hypothesis 1: When β is negative and statistically significant, there exists
an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity; when β is non-negative
and statistically significant, the inverse relationship does not exist.
Moreover, when β is negative, the greater β is, the less significant the inverse rela-
tionship between farm size and land productivity will be.
As agricultural land transactions in China were prohibited or stayed at a low level
during a long period, land market imperfections are one of the most important reasons
to explain the inverse relationship in China (if it exists). Thus, the agricultural land
marketization is conducive to improving the land allocation efficiency and then reducing
the degree of the inverse relationship. In this way, the change of β can reflect the direction
and degree of the variation of land allocation efficiency to a large extent. Denoting the
periods before and after the agricultural land marketization in 2008 by the subscripts
“before” and “after”, we can use the following method to test Hypothesis 2.
Test of Hypothesis 2: When |βafter| − |βbefore| is negative and statistically signif-
icant, the land allocation efficiency improves after the agricultural land marketization,
implying the higher average land productivity.
Moreover, when |βafter| − |βbefore| is negative and statistically significant, the less
|βafter|−|βbefore| is, the higher the degree of the improvement of land allocation efficiency
will be.
Denoting the average operational farm sizes before and after the marketization by
Ai,before and Ai,after, respectively, the test of Hypothesis 3 is rather straightforward.
Test of Hypothesis 3: When Ai,after > Ai,before, the average operational farm
size increases after the agricultural land marketization, implying the lower average land
productivity given that Hypothesis 1 is verified.
In order to test Hypothesis 4, we use the method of factor decomposition. Specifically,
we first estimate (3.5) by using the samples before and after the marketization. The
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= Consafter + βafter lnAi,after + γk,afterCVki,after, (3.7)
in which {Consbefore, βbefore, γk,before} and {Consafter, βafter, γk,after} are the estimation
results of coefficients before and after the marketization, respectively.






= [βafter (lnAi,after − lnAi,before) + lnAi,before (βafter − βbefore)]
+ (γk,afterCVki,after − γk,beforeCVki,before) + (Consafter − Consbefore) . (3.8)


































are the average land productivity before and after the
marketization, respectively; and CVki,before and CVki,after are the sample means of control
variables before and after the marketization, respectively.










, is the growth rate of the average
land productivity before and after the agricultural land marketization. The right-hand




shows the effect of the change of average operational farm size on average land productiv-
ity. When the average operational farm size increases, that is, lnAi,after− lnAi,before > 0,
and the inverse relationship exists, that is, βafter < 0, the effect of the change of aver-
age operational farm size will be negative. Intuitively, given the degree of the inverse
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the change of average operational land size, due to the marketization, affects the av-
erage land productivity. The term lnAi,before (βafter − βbefore) shows the effect of the
change of land allocation efficiency on average land productivity. Because the aver-
age operational farm size is positive, that is, lnAi,before > 0, when the land allocation
efficiency improves, that is, βafter − βbefore > 0, the effect of the change of land al-
location efficiency will be positive. Intuitively, given the average operational land size
before the marketization, the term lnAi,before (βafter − βbefore) reflects how the change
of land allocation efficiency, due to the marketization, affects the average land produc-




+ lnAi,before (βafter − βbefore) is the
essential problem to be tested in this chapter. That is to say, how the agricultural
land marketization affects the average land productivity depends on the net effect of the
changes of average operational farm size and land allocation efficiency. Moreover, terms
γk,afterCVki,after−γk,beforeCVki,before and Consafter−Consbefore show the effects of control
variables and price-adjusted technological level, respectively.
Then, we can test Hypothesis 4 as follows.




+lnAi,before (βafter − βbefore) >
0, the agricultural land marketization improves the average land productivity.
3.4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data we use is from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) database, which
is created by the Carolina Population Center at the University of North Carolina at
Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health (NINH, former National
Institute of Nutrition and Food Safety) at the Chinese Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CCDC). The CHNS database allows us to conduct a panel data analysis,
in which, however, the sample size is too limited. Therefore, we pool observations in
different years and conduct a cross-sectional data analysis. Specifically, we use a sample
of 5313 observations in five years. The sample sizes in the years 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009,
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and 2011 are 512, 1088, 1227, 1251, and 1235, respectively. The data description is in
Table 3.1.
Moreover, Tables 3.2 through 3.9 provide the summary statistics of different samples.
According to Table 3.2, for the sample 2000-2011, the average household size (Hsize) is
2.776; the average dependency ratio (Dratio) is 0.282; and the household head’s mar-
riage rate (Marriage) is 99.1%, implying that a typical household consists of a married
couple and a dependant. For the household head, male (Gend) accounts for 91%; the
average age (Age) is 52.289 years old; and the average education level (Edu) is 6.532
years, implying that household heads are mainly male and relatively old, with relatively
low education level. The average operational farm size (A) is 6.524 mu11, implying a
small scale of agricultural production. According to Tables 3.3 and 3.4, comparing the
sample means before and after the agricultural land marketization (samples 2000-2006
and 2009-2011, respectively), we can find that the average land productivity ( y
A
) after
the marketization is 1643.396 yuan/mu12, which is 204.366 yuan/mu higher than the one
before the marketization. Moreover, there is no significant change in labor input (Labor),
while there is a significant growth of intermediate inputs (Raising). In particular, after
the marketization, the average operational farm size is 7.162 mu, which is 1.198 mu higher
than the one before the marketization.
3.5 Empirical Results
3.5.1 Existence of Inverse Relationship
According to the estimation results of full sample (sample 2000-2011) and samples 2000,
2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011 in Table 3.10, the operational farm size is negatively correlated
with the land productivity, statistically significant at 1% level, implying the existence
of an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity in China, verifying
Hypothesis 1.13
11One mu equals 1/15th of a hectare.
12At the time of surveys, approximately 6.5-8.2 Chinese yuan can be exchanged for each 1 US dollar.
13Some studies also find the existence of an inverse relationship in China (see Benjamin and Brandt,
2002; Chen et al., 2011; Li et al., 2013).
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Specifically, for the full sample, the coefficient of operational farm size (lnA) is -0.587,
statistically significant at 1% level, implying the inverse relationship. The coefficients of
labor input (lnLabor) and intermediate inputs (lnRaising) are 0.112 and 0.360, respec-
tively, both statistically significant at 1% level, implying the positive effects of these two
production factors on land productivity. For the control variables of household charac-
teristics, the coefficients of the household head’s age (Age) and household size (Hsize)
are 0.003 and -0.033, respectively, both statistically significant at 1% level. However,
the coefficients of the household head’s gender (Gend), education level (Edu), marriage
situation (Marriage), and dependency ratio (Dratio) are not statistically significant at
10% level. Therefore, these household characteristics do not significantly affect the land
productivity.
Furthermore, for the samples 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011, the coefficients of
operational farm size are -0.549, -0.689, -0.671, -0.556, and -0.453, respectively, all statis-
tically significant at 1% level, implying the existence of the inverse relationship.
As we have seen, the average operational farm size increases after the agricultural land
marketization. Therefore, given the existence of the inverse relationship, the larger aver-
age operational farm size reduces the average land productivity, verifying then Hypothesis
3.
3.5.2 Higher Land Allocation Efficiency
For the samples 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011, we depict the coefficients of operational
farm size (lnA) in Figure 3.2. We can find then that the coefficient of operational farm
size, or the land allocation efficiency, decreases a lot from 2000 to 2006 and stays at a
low level around 2004 and 2006. However, after the agricultural land marketization in
China in 2008, there is a significant improvement of land allocation efficiency, verifying
Hypothesis 2.
Moreover, the estimation results of samples before and after the agricultural land
marketization in Table 3.11 also show an improvement of land allocation efficiency, veri-
fying again Hypothesis 2. Specifically, the coefficients of operational farm size of samples
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Figure 3.2: Coefficients of Operational Farm Size (lnA)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011
2000-2006 and 2009-2011 are -0.666 and -0.503, respectively, both statistically significant
at 1% level. The difference between these two coefficients is 0.163, which is also statisti-
cally significant at 1% level, implying that the marketization improves the land allocation
efficiency.
3.5.3 Positive Effect of Marketization on Productivity
In order to evaluate the net effect of the agricultural land marketization on average
land productivity according to (3.9), we use the sample means in Tables 3.3 and 3.4
and the estimation results in Table 3.11. According to the calculation results of factor
decomposition in Table 3.12, the marketization improves the land allocation efficiency by
0.163 units and thus improves the average land productivity by 29.1%. The marketization
also increases the average operational farm size by 18.3% and thus reduces the average
land productivity by 9.2%. Therefore, the net effect is that the marketization improves
the average land productivity by 19.9%. These results thus verify Hypothesis 4, that is,
the positive effect of the higher land allocation efficiency dominates the negative effect of
the larger average operational farm size, and thus the agricultural land marketization in
China finally improves the average land productivity.
In fact, the reason why the agricultural land marketization in China can affect the
average land productivity negatively is that the inverse relationship between farm size
and land productivity still exists after the marketization. On the one hand, in the short
run, the agricultural land marketization may not eliminate the land market imperfections
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thoroughly. On the other hand, besides land market imperfections, there exist also other
factors resulting in the inverse relationship, for example, credit market imperfections,
that the agricultural land marketization cannot eliminate. Therefore, as long as the
agricultural land marketization reform continues to deepen and other relevant reforms are
carried out, the inverse relationship would probably disappear, and then the agricultural
land marketization would not affect the average land productivity negatively.
3.6 Conclusion
Based on the perspective of the inverse relationship between farm size and land pro-
ductivity, this chapter proposes that, besides improving the land allocation efficiency,
the agricultural land marketization can also affect the average land productivity through
increasing the average operational farm size.
By using the agricultural land marketization reform in China in 2008 as the indicator
of marketization and the CHNS database, this chapter empirically finds that: first, there
exists an inverse relationship between farm size and land productivity in China; second,
the agricultural land marketization in China improves the land allocation efficiency and
increases the average operational farm size; and third, the higher land allocation efficiency
improves the average land productivity by 29.1% and the larger average operational farm
size reduces the average land productivity by 9.2%, implying that the agricultural land
marketization in China finally improves the average land productivity by 19.9%.
In fact, if land market imperfections are only an minor reason for the existence of the
inverse relationship, the inverse relationship may still be quite strong after the agricultural
land marketization. As a result, the positive effect of the higher land allocation efficiency
may be dominated by the negative effect of the larger average operational farm size,
implying that the agricultural land marketization may finally reduce the average land
productivity. Then, a direction of future research is to explore how the inverse relationship
between farm size and land productivity affects the relationship between agricultural land
marketization and average land productivity in other developing countries.
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3.7 Appendix







is the land productivity. This paper uses the output value per unit area to
represent the land productivity. The unit is yuan/mu. Considering the effects
of price levels in different years, we use the agricultural production price
index in China Statistical Yearbook (2011 price=100) to adjust.
Independent Variable
A A is the farm size operated by a household. The unit is mu.
Control Variables
Labor Labor is the total working time of a household in a year. The unit is
month/household.
Raising Raising is the intermediate inputs, such as seeds, chemical fertilizers,
pesticide, and rents of machines. The unit is yuan.
Age Age is the household head’s age. The unit is year.
Gend Gend is the household head’s gender. “1” denotes male and “0” denotes female.
Edu Edu is the education household head’s education level. Primary school, junior
high school, senior high school, secondary specialized school, undergraduate,
postgraduate or above correspond to 6, 9, 12, 14, 16, and 19 years of
education, respectively. The unit is year.
Marriage Marriage is the household head’s marriage situation. “1” denotes married
and “0” denotes unmarried.
Hsize Hsize is the size of a household. The unit is person.
Dratio Dratio is the ratio of the number of people under 16 or above 60 years old to
the total number of people in a household.
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2000-2011 (Number of Obs. =5313)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, and 2011
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1534.654 1629.477 1.970 75544.700
A 6.524 9.971 1 200
Labor 20.598 11.341 1 79
Raising 1362.925 1672.807 10.209 20816.900
Age 52.289 11.194 18.920 88.180
Gend 0.910 0.286 0 1
Edu 6.532 3.971 0 16
Marriage 0.991 0.097 0 1
Hsize 2.776 1.088 1 9
Dratio 0.282 0.335 0 1
Table 3.3: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2000-2006 (Number of Obs. =2827)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2000, 2004, and 2006
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1439.030 1754.537 1.970 75544.700
A 5.964 7.689 1 90
Labor 20.929 11.456 1 79
Raising 1092.652 1427.561 10.209 20816.900
Age 50.534 10.987 18.920 88.180
Gend 0.915 0.279 0 1
Edu 6.640 3.916 0 16
Marriage 0.987 0.114 0 1
Hsize 2.876 1.112 1 9
Dratio 0.254 0.303 0 1
Table 3.4: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2009-2011 (Number of Obs. =2486)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2009 and 2011
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1643.396 1467.225 45.455 35000
A 7.162 12.022 1 200
Labor 20.222 11.199 1 76
Raising 1670.270 1867.218 20 9999
Age 54.285 11.094 22.030 88.180
Gend 0.905 0.293 0 1
Edu 6.409 4.030 0 16
Marriage 0.995 0.072 0 1
Hsize 2.663 1.050 1 7
Dratio 0.314 0.365 0 1
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Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2000 (Number of Obs. =512)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2000
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1060.061 888.813 29.800 13564.900
A 5.047 5.791 1 75
Labor 14.562 8.255 2 60
Raising 841.860 830.484 40.066 6868.390
Age 47.022 10.108 21.280 88.180
Gend 0.914 0.281 0 1
Edu 6.887 3.782 0 16
Marriage 0.980 0.139 0 1
Hsize 3.322 1.119 2 7
Dratio 0.224 0.218 0 1
Table 3.6: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2004 (Number of Obs. =1088)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2004
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1362.206 865.082 1.970 8756.260
A 5.392 6.638 1 75
Labor 23.720 11.769 2 72
Raising 973.057 1122.650 10.209 10188.700
Age 50.639 10.995 18.920 88.180
Gend 0.921 0.270 0 1
Edu 6.778 3.703 0 16
Marriage 0.980 0.141 0 1
Hsize 2.851 1.109 1 9
Dratio 0.259 0.303 0 1
Table 3.7: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2006 (Number of Obs. =1227)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2006
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1665.286 2446.763 37.772 75544.700
A 6.852 9.045 1 90
Labor 21.110 11.289 1 79
Raising 1303.349 1791.435 20.817 20816.900
Age 51.907 11.019 24.070 85.420
Gend 0.910 0.286 0 1
Edu 6.414 4.139 0 16
Marriage 0.996 0.064 0 1
Hsize 2.711 1.062 1 7
Dratio 0.264 0.331 0 1
CHAPTER 3. AGRICULTURAL LAND MARKETIZATION 140
Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2009 (Number of Obs. =1251)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2009
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1643.996 1339.678 58.027 22050.300
A 7 10.943 1 130
Labor 19.963 11.282 1 76
Raising 1563.504 1799.716 29.286 9760.910
Age 53.786 11.246 22.830 88.180
Gend 0.900 0.300 0 1
Edu 6.368 4.030 0 16
Marriage 0.993 0.085 0 1
Hsize 2.678 1.056 1 7
Dratio 0.298 0.355 0 1
Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics of Sample 2011 (Number of Obs. =1235)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on CHNS 2011
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
y
A
1642.788 1586.553 45.455 35000
A 7.326 13.026 1 200
Labor 20.484 11.112 2 74
Raising 1778.420 1927.900 20 9999
Age 54.791 10.918 22.030 86.900
Gend 0.910 0.286 0 1
Edu 6.452 4.031 0 16
Marriage 0.997 0.057 0 1
Hsize 2.649 1.043 1 7
Dratio 0.329 0.375 0 1
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Table 3.10: Estimation Results for Existence of Inverse Relationship
Note: 1. The standard deviation is inside the parenthesis: *, ** and *** denote the significant level of
10%, 5% and 1%; 2. Village dummies were included in regressions but not reported.
Samples 2000-2011 2000 2004 2006 2009 2011
Dependent Variable: ln y
A
lnA -0.587*** -0.549*** -0.689*** -0.671*** -0.556*** -0.453***
(0.012) (0.044) (0.029) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026)
lnLabor 0.112*** -0.046 0.085** 0.217*** 0.061** -0.004
(0.016) (0.051) (0.042) (0.035) (0.030) (0.041)
lnRaising 0.360*** 0.218*** 0.372*** 0.380*** 0.359*** 0.314***
(0.010) (0.039) (0.025) (0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
Age 0.003*** 0.000 0.001 0.004** -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Gend 0.037 -0.156 0.047 0.035 0.025 0.102*
(0.028) (0.097) (0.072) (0.058) (0.054) (0.062)
Edu -0.004 0.006 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 -0.009**
(0.002) (0.007) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Marriage 0.091 -0.128 0.137 -0.292 0.129 0.031
(0.079) (0.175) (0.134) (0.242) (0.174) (0.299)
Hsize -0.033*** 0.036 -0.008 -0.039** -0.009 0.009
(0.008) (0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022)
Dratio 0.024 0.279** -0.032 0.016 0.076 -0.027
(0.027) (0.119) (0.067) (0.055) (0.052) (0.057)
Cons 5.240*** 5.975*** 4.993*** 5.151*** 5.267*** 5.596***
(0.563) (0.417) (0.361) (0.340) (0.281) (0.406)
Number of Obs. 5313 512 1088 1227 1251 1235
R2 0.378 0.511 0.463 0.544 0.452 0.310
Adjusted R2 0.361 0.349 0.387 0.489 0.386 0.228
F -statistic 21.840 3.156 6.077 9.897 6.916 3.781
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Table 3.11: Estimation Results for Effect of Agricultural Land Marketization
Note: 1. The standard deviation is inside the parenthesis: *, ** and *** denote the significant level of
10%, 5% and 1%; 2. The standard deviation of the difference between the coefficients before and after






and the test statistics is Z = β2009−2011−β2000−2006
σβ
(see Clogg et al., 1995); 3. Village dummies were
included in regressions but not reported.
Samples 2000-2006 2009-2011 Difference
Dependent Variable: ln y
A
lnA -0.666*** -0.503*** 0.163***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.024)
lnLabor 0.167*** 0.030 -0.137***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.032)
lnRaising 0.369*** 0.331*** -0.038*
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021)
Age 0.070 0.050 -0.020
(0.094) (0.152) (0.179)
Gend 0.014 0.046 0.032
(0.040) (0.040) (0.057)
Edu 0.004*** -0.001 -0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Marriage -0.001 -0.007** -0.006
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Hsize -0.046*** 0.006 0.052***
(0.011) (0.014) (0.018)
Dratio 0.037 0.021 -0.016
(0.039) (0.038) (0.054)
Cons 5.159*** 5.534*** 0.375
(0.576) (0.230) (0.620)
Number of Obs. 2827 2486
R2 0.440 0.339
Adjusted R2 0.411 0.300





































Table 3.12: Factor Decomposition of Improvement of Average Land Productivity
Note: In the factor decomposition, we omit the variables such that their coefficients are not statistically significant before or after the agricultural land
marketization and the variables such that the differences of their coefficients between before and after the marketization are not statistically significant. X, β











7.272 7.405 0.133 - - 0.133
lnA 1.786 1.969 0.183 -0.666 -0.503 0.163 -0.092 0.291 0.199
lnRaising 6.996 7.421 0.425 0.369 0.331 -0.038 0.141 -0.266 -0.125
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